



# Intelligence Information Report

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE - HISTORICAL  
COLLECTION DIVISION  
DATE: 06-18-2012

DIRECTORATE OF  
PLANS

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REPORT NO. CSDB-312/02490-70

DATE DISTR. 23 December 1970

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REPORT NO. CSDB-312/02490-70

DATE DISTR. 23 December 1970

COUNTRY USSR/Warsaw Pact

DOI Prior to June 1970

SUBJECT Warsaw Pact Lectures on Strategy for War in Europe

ACQ

FIELD NO.



### Summary

The following report was translated from Russian. It appears to consist of incomplete notes taken at a series of lectures. Internal evidence shows that the individual who took the notes was [redacted]. The substance of the report indicates that the subject of the lectures was military strategy, particularly as it relates to a possible war in Europe. Information is given on both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The notes deal primarily with Warsaw Pact offensive operations and pertinent intelligence collection, but at least one lecture on defensive operations is part of the series.

### End of Summary



[redacted] Comment: The content and apparent date of this report indicate that it may be related to CSDB-312/01857-70, which we speculate to have some connection with reported strategic military courses in Moscow in April 1970. Portions of the notes which were not received or are illegible are indicated by an estimate of the number of words or lines of original text missing. Paragraphs have been numbered for convenience. The same abbreviation was used in the notes for "control point" and "launcher".

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Question 2

Military Strategy -- a Science

1. Military strategy occupies a subordinate position in relation to military doctrine. It is guided by the tenets of the doctrine concerning the nature of a future war, preparation of a nation in a military sense and tasks of the armed forces and their training.

2. Military doctrine -- This is the officially adopted view of a government (armed forces) on the nature of modern wars and means of conducting them, i.e., on the fundamental questions of defense of the socialist commonwealth from imperialist aggression as well as the requirements arising from these views for preparation of a nation in a military sense and the tasks of the armed forces in a war.

3. It is worked out by the political leadership of a nation, proceeding from domestic and foreign policies on the basis of the tenets of Marxist-Leninist teaching about war and the armed forces.

4. It constitutes a historical category, inasmuch as it changes depending on the balance of power in the international arena, on new policy requirements, potentialities of the economy, the achievements of science, and the level of preparedness of the armed forces. (Also of the enemy). It has political and military-technical foundations.

5. The sphere of military strategy includes the elaboration of specific plans for war and the practical leadership of the armed forces during peacetime and war on the basis of the tenets and requirements of military doctrine.

6. Soviet military strategy is a system of scientific knowledge concerning the nature of modern wars, methods and forms for waging them, the structure of the armed forces and the preparation of the nation militarily, and also the sphere of practical activity of the political leadership of the nation and of the supreme military command for training of the armed forces, and their employment to check aggression and achieve political goals in a war.

7. The content of military strategy emanates from the balance of forces in the international arena and is determined by the political goals of a nation, the level of development of weaponry, and the specific tasks of the armed forces in a war.

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8. The tasks of military strategy include the following:

- research into the conditions for the origins and nature of a war;
- determination of the methods and forms for the conduct of strategic operations by the armed forces;
- determination of the structure of armed forces and their strategic deployment;
- elaboration of measures to assure constant combat preparedness and to carry out the mobilization of the armed forces;
- elaboration of the requirements for preparing the nation in the field of defense;
- research into the organization of material and technical supply of the armed forces;
- research into questions of the leadership of the armed forces and the system of control;
- study of the strategic views of the probable enemy and his capabilities for waging war.

9. In researching the conditions for the origin and nature of wars, strategy examines the determining factors, evaluates the balance of political forces, the probable composition of the opposing coalitions, their geographic position, the status of military and economic potentials, means and methods for waging wars, their duration, intensity and territorial scope.

10. Depending on the nature of a future war, the theory of military strategy elaborates the questions of the structure of the armed forces, devoting special attention to elaboration of the forms of strategic operations, planning and determination of the composition of forces, the composition and training of strategic reserves, the preparation of the territory of the nation as a theater of military operations, and the organization of strategic intelligence.

11. Depending on the conditions of the origins of a future war and the strategic goals and tasks of the armed forces, there is elaborated a theory concerning their strategic deployment.

12. In examining the types of armed forces and the bases of their structure, it studies the factors determining their employment, the tasks of the branches of the armed forces, the interrelationship between them and prospects

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for their development. It studies the role of the psychological factor in warfare.

13. It works out recommendations for weapon systems, taking into account the capabilities of the economy and the development of science and technology.

14. It researches the material-technical supply of the armed forces, and also new problems in the leadership of the armed forces.

15. Strategy plays a leading role in military art.

Question 3

A Strategic Operation in a Theater  
of Military Operations

A) The Grouping of the Armed Forces of NATO in Europe  
and the Possible Nature of the Conduct of Military  
Operations

16. Within the confines of the European theaters of military operations there is situated the large grouping of NATO armed forces. It includes:

- 3.5 million men of NATO (member nations)
- 400,000 men from Spain.

Of this number, the composition of the combined forces of NATO includes 1,300,000 men with equipment.

17. Strategic air forces remain under national jurisdiction (U.S., Britain and France).

18. Naval forces are organized on the same bases. The largest and technically best equipped armed forces in the European theater of military operations, excluding those of the U.S., are those of Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy. Their total numbers exceed 2,000,000 men, or 60 percent of all the countries of NATO.

19. The mobilizational potential of all the European countries of NATO and Spain amounts to 30-35 million men.

20. This grouping is characterized by the following:

- nuclear/missile submarines:
  - 14th squadron at Holy Loch
  - 16th squadron at Rota

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18th squadron on patrol

2nd squadron in the U.S.

Constantly within the confines of the European theater of military operations are 15-20 submarines. In addition there are the submarines of Great Britain and France.

- strategic air forces -- Great Britain and France have 130-140 delivery aircraft.

It is possible that at the beginning of war there will be a transfer of aircraft from the U.S. to airfields in Britain, Spain, and Morocco.

- naval forces -- the grouping will be created with the initiation of war. There now exists a grouping of several ships (6).

In case of war, there will be earmarked two to three carrier strike forces of the U.S. and Great Britain, four to six strike carriers with 150-200 delivery aircraft. In the Mediterranean Sea there is the 6th Fleet with two strike carriers with 100 delivery aircraft.

- grouping of tactical air forces

The combined air forces of NATO consist of the Norwegian Air Force, the zone of the Baltic Straits, the 2nd and 4th Combined Air Strike Commands and the 5th and 6th Combined Air Strike Commands -- in all about 2,700 aircraft, including about 900 delivery aircraft.

The main grouping in the Central European theater of military operations -- 1,400 aircraft, of which 700 are delivery aircraft.

- grouping of air defense resources -- three zones:

Northern 1/Norway, Denmark	3 battalions of anti-air- craft guided missiles
Central 2/West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands	40 battalions of anti-air- craft guided missiles
Southern 3/Italy, Greece, Turkey	11 battalions of anti-air- craft guided missiles

Total: 1,600 antiaircraft missile launchers

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- grouping of ground forces

North European  
theater of  
military operations - divisions of West Germany (6)

Central European  
theater of  
military operations - two army groups -- 11 + 12  
divisions

Southern European  
theater of  
military operations - 27 divisions (18 combat ready)

51 divisions + 14 (three U.S.)

At the beginning of war an additional two French divisions  
on the territory of West Germany.

-- about 2,000 nuclear delivery vehicles plus air-  
craft carriers, atomic submarines and strategic air  
forces = 2,400-2,500 units.

- strong aspects of this grouping:

- 1) ample number of nuclear delivery vehicles;
- 2) advantageous operational-tactical position;
- 3) high degree of combat preparedness;

- weak spots in the grouping:

- 1) multi-national composition;
- 2) over-extended distribution;
- 3) remoteness of missile units from the borders;
- 4) large number of obsolete aircraft;
- 5) absence of depth of operational-strategic buildup.

Preparation of the Theater of Military Operations

21. Depots -- 180, 120 fixed positions of anti-aircraft  
guided missile batteries. Sixty naval bases (500 ports),  
communications grids (40,000 kilometers) 20 fixed command  
posts, 9,000 kilometers of pipelines, 1.8 million cubic  
meters of fuel storage capacity, 1,000 depots, 1,200 air-  
fields (500 major ones) and 250 have a takeoff-landing  
strip of 2,400 meters or more.

22. Contemporary military doctrine of the U.S. fore-  
sees two types of war:

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- 1) General nuclear war
- 2) Limited war

This is understood to mean;

- a) war without employment of nuclear weapons
- b) war with limited employment of nuclear weapons
- c) local war

A limited war can be conducted in Europe.

Nature of Military Operations

23. The nature of the military operations of NATO armed forces depends on the nature and methods of onset of the war.

In case of general nuclear war, the combined armed forces of NATO anticipate the execution of a mass nuclear attack on the theater, i.e., the conduct of a so-called nuclear offensive, which is a composite part of an overall offensive. It is the initiation of an operation of the branches of the armed forces in the theater of military operations.

24. The goal of the nuclear offensive is:

- to destroy the means of nuclear attack
- gain nuclear superiority
- seize the initiative
- create the conditions for the conduct of operations by all branches of the armed forces.

25. It is anticipated that three primary tasks will be resolved in a nuclear offensive:

- Gain nuclear superiority and air superiority. Therefore the strikes are delivered against nuclear/missile resources and aircraft, control points, depots of nuclear munitions and air defenses.
- Isolate the theater of military operations from the arrival of reserves and delivery of material resources. This is carried out by the establishment of nuclear barriers -- on natural lines (rivers, mountain ridges) stretching along the front for 200-300 kilometers and to a depth of 25-40 kilometers.

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26. In the West European theater of military operations there can be created five or six barriers on two or three lines to an over-all depth of up to 400 kilometers.

- Effect destruction of the armed forces in the theater of military operations by mass nuclear strikes against the main groupings of ground forces and aircraft.

The main means are tactical aircraft, carrier-based aircraft and part of the strategic aircraft, and also part of the strategic and operational-tactical missiles. An important part is played by atomic submarines.

27. A nuclear offensive in a theater of military operations is executed at a depth of up to 1,000-1,200 kilometers.

A nuclear offensive in a theater of military operations can last several days, three to seven, and consist of two or three mass nuclear strikes.

28. The first mass strike must be the most powerful -- 60 percent of the nuclear munitions allotted for the nuclear offensive in the theater of military operations. It must be unexpected and brief (2 to 3 hours).

29. The second mass nuclear strike comes after several hours.

30. The third nuclear strike is within one or two days after the end of the second.

31. Simultaneously with the nuclear strikes, ground forces go over to the offensive on the strategic axes or from the areas of concentration 30-50 kilometers from the national borders from the areas of permanent disposition.

If there is failure, shift to the defensive.

32. The command of NATO anticipates the conduct of limited war.

33. The main role in operations carried out by conventional weapons is given to ground forces and tactical aircraft, while on a coastal axis it belongs to carrier-based aircraft.

34. It is supposed that the combat operations of troops will take place under conditions of constant threat of employment of nuclear weapons and, therefore, the principles of organization and conduct of combat operations remain the same as under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons.

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35. Special importance is attached to tactical aircraft as the main force capable of delivering mass strikes against objectives located in the enemy depth. It is viewed as a means to seize the initiative. It must seize air superiority (destroy aircraft of the enemy on the airfields).

36. In the course of a war, nuclear weapons can be employed.

B) Goals and Tasks of a Strategic Operation

37. - The strategic goals [word missing] final result of military operations in the course of which is achieved the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy.

- (\*) - The destruction of his military economy, disorganization of his system of control.
- Seizure of territory [word missing] takes place a radical change in the military-political situation in one or several [word missing].

38. These goals depend on the balance of political forces in the international arena, economic and military factors, as well as the political goals of the country.

39. They depend on the composition of the grouping of the armed forces [word missing] military-geographic situation in the theater of military operations.

40. The goal is achieved by means of fulfillment by the groupings of armed forces of a number of strategic tasks:

- defeat of the main grouping of the armed forces of the enemy in the theater of military operations and above all destruction of his nuclear means;
- repulsion of the attack of the enemy in the aerospace environment using the forces and means of air defense;
- destruction of military production, undermining of the economy of individual countries of the hostile coalition;
- disorganization of the system of governmental and military control in the theater of military operations or on the territory of individual countries;
- seizure and retention of vitally important areas of territory of the enemy.

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41. Depending on the specific conditions of the situation, the content and methods for fulfillment of the tasks can vary. This depends on the requirements of policy, the weapons being employed, the counteractions of the enemy, and conditions in the theater of military operations.

42. The tasks are fulfilled using the forces of all branches of the armed forces -- strategic rocket troops, long-range aviation, nuclear submarines, as well as groupings of the individual branches of the armed forces.

C) Content of Strategic Operations in a Theater of Military Operations

43. Strategic operations in a theater of military operations are a qualitatively new phenomenon in Soviet military art. Historically - a war was initiated with a deep offensive operation; the Second World War confirmed this.

44. Now there has appeared the nuclear/missile weapon. What is new is that decisive defeat of the troops of the enemy is delivered simultaneously on the entire territory of the theater of military operations with nuclear weapons.

45. A strategic operation is the coordinated military actions of rocket troops, fronts, fleets, and other combined branches of the armed forces, conducted according to a unified design or plan and under unified leadership for the attainment of the main goals of the war in a given theater:

- utter defeat of the forces of the enemy,
- \*- destruction of his military economy,
- occupation of the most important areas and elimination of countries of the hostile coalition from the war.

46. The specific content of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations will depend on the nature the war as a whole takes on.

47. A strategic operation at present may be conducted under conditions of non-nuclear war, which can grow into nuclear war.

D) Forces and Means Which Can Be Introduced for Conduct of a Strategic Operation

48. The principal means for the conduct of an operation are strategic rocket troops, nuclear/missile submarines,

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long-range aviation and the fronts. An important part in it will belong to the troops of air defense of the country and naval forces.

49. Constituent elements of a strategic operation can be:

- 1) strikes of strategic missiles against the more important facilities of the enemy in the entire depth of the theater of military operations;
- 2) the first and subsequent air operations by long-range aviation;
- 3) the first and subsequent operations of the fronts;
- 4) the operations of the fleets conducted independently or jointly with long-range aviation for destruction of aircraft carriers, missile submarines, destruction of shore installations, disrupting sea communications and putting ashore amphibious forces;
- 5) airborne operations;
- 6) combat actions of air defense troop formations to repel the first and subsequent air strikes of the enemy.

50. The decisive act will be the delivery of the first nuclear strike by the strategic nuclear forces and resources of the fronts and naval fleets.

51. The opposing sides will suffer losses, and then the will of the human being will be important.

E) Periods of the Strategic Operation, Tasks of the Troops, Air Forces, the Navy and the Probable Nature of Actions

52. Depending on the weapons being employed, a strategic operation in a theater of military operations can have several periods which will differ one from the other in their goals, special content and methods of operations. Such nominal periods can be the following:

1) Period of Non-Nuclear Actions

This will be when the strategic operation commences from a military conflict or unleashing by the enemy of a non-nuclear war. The enemy can have limited political goals.

Both sides will then conduct decisive combat actions, striving to improve their political and strategic positions,

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weaken the grouping of nuclear forces of the enemy and fulfill their tasks as rapidly as possible.

During this period, mobilization will be conducted, reserves will be moved up, troops will be reinforced.

The enemy, under conditions of a critical situation, may go over to the employment of nuclear weapons. This may lead to massive losses of troops. Therefore, it is necessary to use all means to destroy his launchers and nuclear delivery aircraft and keep one's own nuclear forces in combat readiness.

The duration of this period can vary.

2) Period of Decisive Nuclear Actions

This is most important. It may commence following the non-nuclear period or it may comprise the first period of a strategic operation if it commences with the employment of nuclear weapons.

The basis is the delivery of nuclear strikes using strategic means of fronts and fleets followed by the conduct of decisive offensives by fronts and groupings of other branches of the armed forces.

The best form of offensive following a nuclear strike will be an offensive by air.

This can be airborne large units and ground forces.

This makes it possible to bypass destroyed areas, zones of contamination, and increase the tempo of the offensive.

Nuclear strikes lead to radical changes in the situation and even to critical conditions. Losses of troops are great. For continuation of the war new forces from the interior, airborne troops, reserves and newly formed elements will be necessary.

During this period the main goals of the operation must be achieved. This period will be of short duration and will be terminated with the expenditure of nuclear weapons accumulated during peacetime, with the destruction of targeted objectives and troop groupings, or capitulation of the nations subjected to the strikes.

3) Period of Concluding Actions

This will be characterized by the fronts and fleets having to destroy the remaining groupings of the enemy on land and sea, primarily using conventional weapons and possibly with the employment of a small quantity of

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nuclear weapons against the most important targets and troops which refuse to capitulate.

This period can be relatively lengthy, since there will have to be time to liquidate the consequences of the nuclear strikes, bypass destroyed areas, clean up the territory, destroy and capture the enemy and establish a military administration.

#### Question 4

##### Measures Conducted in Preparation for the Operation

53. Preparation for a strategic operation includes an involved complex of measures; the chief ones are:

- evolution of the decision and elaboration of the general concept of the operation, based on the goals of the war;
- determination of the required forces and resources for the operation;
- completion of the plan of the operation;
- establishing the tasks for the formations;
- deployment of forces and resources in the theater and organization of joint actions-between them;
- combat support of the strategic operation;
- elaboration of measures to assure constant combat readiness of the groupings of armed forces which have been created;
- comprehensive materiel support of the strategic operation;
- organization of control of the groupings of armed forces in the operation.

##### A) Planning the Operation and the First Nuclear Strike in the Theater of Military Operations

54. This is carried out in peacetime by the General Staff on the basis of the decision of the Supreme High Command, (Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye) taking into account the capabilities of the groupings of one's own troops and those of the enemy and the presumed nature of their operations, as well as the military-political, economic, geographic and other conditions of the theater of military operations.

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55. Participating in the planning are the commanders-in-chief and staffs of the branches of armed forces, the commands and staffs of the military districts, naval forces, directorates of the Ministry of Defense and staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries.

56. The purpose of planning is to determine methods, procedure and sequence for fulfillment of tasks in the entire depth of the theater of military operations, establishment of the procedures for joint action, and support of the operation.

57. All the problems are reflected in the unified plan for the strategic operation in the theater of military operations.

58. For attainment of the strategic goals and accomplishment of the strategic tasks there are planned nuclear strikes by strategic rocket troops, long-range aviation, operations by fronts, fleets, airborne operations and combat actions of air defense troops.

59. In greatest detail are elaborated the first nuclear strike and the first operations, while subsequent actions are indicated in a general fashion -- this will depend on the actual conditions prevailing after the nuclear strikes.

60. Planning for a strategic operation must guarantee the successful accomplishment of tasks by the groupings of armed forces, both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons.

61. For the conduct of an operation without nuclear weapons, it is necessary to have a strong grouping in the first echelon, strong artillery and air preparation, and to plan strikes against the weak places in the enemy operational make-up. Commit strong echelons -- ~~with~~ nuclear weapons strikes are delivered against the strongest enemy -- artillery preparation and air support can be dispensed with.

62. The most important thing in planning is the employment of nuclear weapons. Planning the first nuclear strike in a theater of military operations consists of determining the procedure and methods of operation of the strategic rocket troops, long-range aviation, missile-launching submarines and the operational-tactical means of the fronts and fleets.

63. Planning will include the following:

- an analysis of the grouping of ground forces, aviation, naval forces and air defense resources of the enemy;

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- military-economic and other objectives in the depth of his territory;
- a detailed evaluation and selection of targets for destruction;
- determination of the tasks of strategic rocket troops, missile submarines, long-range aviation, and the resources of the fronts and fleets and procedures for joint action;
- determination of the expected results of the first nuclear strike;
- elaboration of measures for support of the employment of nuclear resources.

64. The first nuclear strike must assure the frustration of the enemy's nuclear offensive and must be executed unexpectedly and in brief time periods.

65. Resources must be employed massively, in the entire depth of the theater of military operations, to simultaneously destroy the major installations comprising his military and economic power. The strike must be of maximum strength.

66. It is necessary to assure the security of one's own troops.

67. The first nuclear strike can be delivered in the course of the operation.

B) Organization of Joint Action

68. The conduct of a strategic operation can involve several tens of formations and large units of all the branches of the armed forces, the resources of strategic rocket troops, and the operational-tactical resources of several fronts and naval fleets.

69. The employment of all these forces and resources must be strictly coordinated according to specific tasks, areas, objectives, times and methods of action and use of heterogeneous means. Joint action must be organized.

70. The organization of joint action is a most important function of the leadership of the strategic operation, the commands and staffs at all levels, and of its uninterrupted support; it is one of the decisive conditions for successful achievement of the goals of the operation.

71. Mutual action must provide for:

- 1) precision and accuracy of time and place for delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy;

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- 2) safeguarding the groupings of one's own troops while delivering nuclear strikes;
- 3) conduct of an offensive following the first nuclear strike in order to achieve as rapidly as possible complete defeat of the enemy and occupation of the more important areas in the theater of military operations.
- 4) Coordination of actions of troops, aviation, and forces of the fleet in repulsing an intrusion by the enemy.

72. The fundamental measures for organization of joint action are the following:

- purposeful allocation of objectives for destruction among the branches of armed forces and the specific delivery vehicles;
- agreement as to time and procedure for delivery of nuclear strikes;
- coordination of nuclear strikes and actions of troops and forces which are exploiting the results of these strikes;
- coordination of the actions of the fronts;
- planning measures for mutual assistance and support which are directed at sustaining uninterrupted joint action in the course of the operation.

73. The bases for the organization of mutual action are the following:

- the goals and concept of the strategic operation;
- the specific tasks levied on the operational formations;
- capabilities of the branches of armed forces;
- and the methods of action employed by them.

74. Joint action is most thoroughly organized:

- for the period of the first nuclear strike;
- for frustrating a nuclear attack by the enemy;
- for the conduct of the initial operations of the branches of armed forces;
- and in case combat operations are initiated, using conventional weapons.

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75. Practical measures are the coordination of the operations of branches of the armed forces among one another and with the nuclear strikes of the strategic rocket troops, and the organization of joint action in each of the operations of the branches of the armed forces.

76. The fundamentals of joint action are incorporated into the decision for its conduct. Most important is the correct determination of the tasks of the branches of armed forces and operational formations and agreement on the procedure for their fulfillment.

77. The chief organization for joint action in a strategic operation in a theater of military operations is the General Staff.

C) Measures for Maintenance of Constant Combat Readiness of the Groupings of Armed Forces

78. Combat readiness of armed forces is understood to mean their specific status characterized by their capability to accomplish combat tasks assigned them.

79. Combat readiness of armed forces is determined as follows:

- readiness of the nuclear forces and resources of air defense to frustrate and repel a nuclear attack by the enemy and to deliver against him a blow with full force in a short period of time;
- capability from the very beginning of the war to conduct strategic operations with available forces in the theater of military operations and operations by the branches of the armed services on land, sea, and in the aerospace sphere;
- capabilities of organs of the rear services to provide material and technical support to the armed forces in difficult conditions prevailing at the beginning of a nuclear war;
- the capability of organs of control to assure centralized leadership of the groupings of armed forces at all levels under conditions of mass destruction and extremely mobile actions.

80. Constant combat readiness of the armed forces is characterized by the daily activity of units and large units during peacetime:

- troops and staffs are perfecting their readiness -- combat and operational training is in progress;

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- material and technical means are in a condition to be used on short notice;
- there is round-the-clock duty at launch installations;
- there exist reliable communications;
- individual units are on duty.

81. Increased combat readiness:

- assures that troops can be brought to full combat readiness on short notice;
- the number of units standing combat duty is increased;
- shifts of duty officers are at launch installations;
- equipment is made ready;
- material resources are loaded;
- guards are increased in units and staffs;
- radio means are switched to receive;
- exercises are terminated;
- officers are in the garrisons.

82. Full combat readiness means readiness of large units and units to fulfill assigned combat tasks. This is brought about by sounding the combat alert.

83. Combat readiness of the armed forces is assured by:

- high quality and sufficient quantity of forces and resources for conduct of a war;
- organization of troops and forces in accordance with their level of development and assigned tasks;
- high quality of training for personnel, commanders and staffs;
- high psychological and political state;
- sensible disposition areas;
- the presence of the necessary number of large units ready for immediate action;

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- the existence of current operations plans;
- well-organized and functioning intelligence collection;
- measures for protection of troops from mass destruction;
- material-technical support;
- a good system for troop control.

D) Organization of Leadership in a Strategic Operation

84. In peacetime, the basic problems of leadership include:

- the conduct of strategic intelligence against the probable enemy;
- constant refinement of the established plans;
- conduct of exercises to accumulate experience and check the validity of plans which have been worked up;
- preparation of the theater of military operations and of the strategic reserves;
- organization of material-technical support of the operation;
- creation of a reliable system of control of the grouping of armed forces;
- systematic supervision of the readiness of the armed forces and prompt conversion of them to full combat readiness in accordance with the situation.

Preparation of Areas Along the Border

85. In the course of an operation the strategic leadership must be provided with well-functioning communications:

- vigilantly monitors the situation;
- refines or poses new tasks;
- restores joint action;
- assures delivery of material means to the troops;

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- reinforces them in good time;

The major principle is centralized control.

Question 5

Conduct of a Strategic Operation

86. A strategic operation in a theater of military operations can be initiated and conducted within varying conditions of the military-political situation, and depending on this, will develop in different ways. The most complex conditions will arise in case of surprise nuclear attack.

87. Because of this, we have to disrupt his nuclear attack and quickly develop decisive operations by all our forces.

A) Delivery of the Initial Nuclear Attack in the Theater of Military Operations by Strategic Nuclear Forces and Resources of the Fronts and Fleets

88. The first to deliver the strike are the strategic rocket troops; simultaneously or following them the missile submarines -- those which are located within range of targets -- deliver their strikes. Subsequently, long-range aviation. Its takeoff from airfields will be executed simultaneously with the launch of strategic missiles -- a strike against objectives in the maritime part of the theater.

89. Operational-tactical missiles from fronts, fleets, armies and divisions will, to the extent possible, be launched in strikes simultaneously with the strike of strategic missiles. First those on duty and then according to readiness.

90. Aircraft of a front must evade the strike and deliver their own strike.

91. Part of the objectives which were previously planned may change their locations; it will be necessary to have re-reconnaissance in the course of the strike which has already been initiated. This will be executed by aircraft of the front.

Fleets must systematically keep watch over the targets of their strikes. (Does this mean these targets are solely maritime resources?)

92. The first salvo of the strategic rocket troops will be the signal for the strike by all the others.

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B) Repelling the Nuclear Attack by the Enemy

93. This is done by vigorous operations of the forces and resources of air defense of the fronts, fleets and air defense troops of the country.

94. Successful repulsion requires the constant presence of duty forces and resources of air defense, as well as the rapid commitment of all the remaining air defense forces and resources.

95. As a result of the strikes, the situation in the theater will change radically. There will be great losses of troops. Individual groupings will lose their combat effectiveness in the rear area and in the border area; there will be great destruction and contamination.

C) Conduct of Offensive Operations by Fronts, Fleets, Airborne Operations and the Utilization of Other Branches of the Armed Forces

96. Following the initial nuclear strike, within the smallest possible interval in time, troops of the fronts begin to advance into zones where contamination is not too dangerous, with the task of completing the defeat of the surviving groupings of the enemy and of occupying the more important areas of the theater.

97. Under favorable circumstances, the offensive can commence immediately on all the main axes, but in a more complex situation -- at different times and not even on all axes -- there can be great losses of troops, destruction and contamination. In this case, the main task will be to restore the combat effectiveness of the strike groupings.

98. In this period it is expedient to utilize airborne troops which bypass the zones of heavy radioactive contamination, to land in the more important areas in the depth of the theater of military operations and undertake combat actions.

99. The offensive of the fronts in the course of the operation will be the combination of nuclear strikes of operation-tactical resources against the surviving groupings, with the swift movement of tank and combined-arms armies on individual axes in the depth of the theater.

100. Delivery of strikes on several axes for the purpose of cutting off the remaining enemy forces and subsequently destroying them piecemeal may be most advantageous in this situation.

101. Each commander who is master of the situation must strive to advance, avoiding protracted battles, to reach the designated points.

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102. The front will make extensive use of tactical assaults by helicopters, increasing the tempo of advance of the troops.

103. Troops will have to overcome zones of contamination, destruction and fire; there are pertinent norms of instruction. It is possible that it will be necessary to await a decrease in radiation if there are no ways of bypassing.

104. During this period, amphibious forces can be landed on the enemy's coast and islands. In the course of the operation, strategic rocket troops will restore their resources which have been hit by the enemy and will continue to deliver nuclear strikes against objectives indicated by the General Staff.

105. Long-range aviation, in joint actions with the fleet, will hit aircraft carriers, missile submarines and also mobile objectives, on behalf of the fronts. ||

106. The navy will deliver missile strikes against the following:

- objectives on the coast and in the depth of the theater of military operations;
- complete the destruction of the strike forces of the fleet;
- interdict communications;
- render aid to the fronts advancing along coastal axes by:
  - a) amphibious landings;
  - b) seizing control of straits;
  - c) supporting maritime transport.
- transfer bases to ports which have not been destroyed.

107. Air defense troops of the country -- will begin to move with the commencement of the advance of the first-echelon troops of the front; radiotechnical resources of air defense will follow them, enlarging their field of coverage.

Fighter aircraft of air defense of the country will cover the troops of the front. Subsequently these aircraft may be transferred to the air army by decision of the General Staff.

Air defense troops which have withdrawn from their installations may move out.

It is important to destroy the enemy's reserves if any remain.

D) Protection of Troops from Nuclear Weapons and Restoration of Combat Effectiveness of Troops After a Nuclear Attack by the Enemy

108. In all cases, after a nuclear strike one should begin by rendering medical aid to people, then withdraw troops to uncontaminated areas, replace water and food, and decontaminate weapons and equipment.

E) Features of the Conduct of Operations with Employment of Conventional Means of Destruction

109. This must be initiated by surprise strikes by our air forces against the aircraft of the enemy on airfields and destroying them in aerial engagements.

110. Actions of aircraft for this purpose may take the form of an air operation -- in the course of which it will be necessary to deliver two or three mass strikes against airfields and launchers of the enemy. The most important thing is to catch the enemy's aircraft on airfields, or destroy them in the air.

111. Depending on the situation, in the air, it can prove impractical to reserve aircraft for a nuclear strike.

112. At sea - a joint operation of fleets and long-range aviation to destroy naval forces of the enemy - aircraft carriers and missile submarines.

113. The fronts will deliver deep, splintering strikes with subsequent encirclement and destruction of groupings, conducting meeting engagements on some axes -- and on others breaking through the defense, repulsing its counterstrikes.

114. It is not excluded that on certain axes it will be necessary to go over to the defense.

115. Strategic rocket troops are held in readiness for delivery of a crushing nuclear strike.

116. The main attention must be directed toward destruction of the means of nuclear attack. In the course of such an operation there can arise a critical situation in which the enemy decides to employ nuclear weapons. In this situation, the enemy is not to be allowed to preempt us in the delivery of nuclear strikes.

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Seminar on the TopicFundamentals of the Preparation and Conduct  
of an Offensive Operation of a Front and ArmyQuestion 1The Role, Purpose, Tasks and Scope of an Offensive Operation

117. Several fronts will participate in a strategic operation in a theater of military operations. Their role and place will not be the same. The goals, tasks and scope of each operation may vary.

118. The goals, tasks and scope of both front and army operations are determined by a number of factors, the most important of which are:

- tenets of military doctrine;
- the military-political situation;
- the concept of the senior commander conducting the operation;
- the operational situation;
- combat capabilities and the psychological and political status of the troops;
- conditions of joint action with neighboring elements;
- composition, grouping and possible actions of the enemy;
- physical and geographic features of the theater of military operations.

119. A war can be conducted with or without employment of nuclear weapons. An offensive operation can be conducted from beginning to end without employing nuclear weapons but under conditions of constant threat of their employment.

120. For each of these conditions, the role of an offensive operation of a front and army in achieving the goals of the strategic operation in the theater of military operations will vary.

121. In a strategic operation with employment of nuclear weapons, the decisive role will be played by strategic rocket troops and the nuclear forces of the front and army.

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122. The role of offensive operations of a front and army is summed up as the conclusive defeat of the forces of the enemy and occupation of his territory, and destruction of those forces which were not subjected to nuclear strikes.

123. Without employment of nuclear weapons, the major role in defeating the enemy on land in the theater of military operations will belong to the fronts, which in joint action with long-range aviation and air defense troops of the country will fulfill its tasks.

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124. ... will be the main force in occupying the enemy's territory.

125. The role of each of the operations of the fronts and armies, the content of their goals and tasks, will be substantially influenced by the conditions of the military-political situation in the theater of military operations, the balance of forces of the hostile coalition, which countries lie in the zone of advance of the front; its significance; how the composition of the hostile coalition may change in the course of military actions; what will be the role of the front or army in eliminating one or another country from the war, etc.

126. The concept of the strategic operation will have a direct effect on the offensive operation of a front, and that of the front on the army.

127. In the concept for an operation the senior commander specifies:

- the place and role of a given operational formation (in the first or second echelon, on the axis of the main strike or of other strikes).
- the goal of the operation, tasks, conditions for joint action.

128. From the concept of the operation, by decision of the senior commander, arises the degree of participation in the accomplishment of tasks of a given operation.

129. The role, goal, tasks and scope of the front and army operation are influenced by the combat capabilities of the troops of the front and army.

130. A modern front is composed of:

- three to four combined-arms armies,
- one to two tank armies,

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five to seven divisions of reserve,

one air army (one to two fighter-bomber divisions, one bomber division),

one to two front missile brigades.

Two or three reinforced artillery divisions, two or three tank destroyer artillery brigades; the reserves of the Supreme High Command may have up to 150-170 launchers, of which 60-70 are operational-tactical, up to 6,000-8,000 tanks; 3,000-4,000 guns and mortars; 600-1,000 combat aircraft, of which 150-225 are delivery vehicles, 6,000-8,000 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

131. An army has 5-6 divisions, of which 1-2 are tank, an army brigade -- 25-30 launch installations, of which 9 are operational-tactical; up to 1,350-1,700 tanks; 750-850 guns; 300-360 antitank missiles and up to 130 antitank guns.

132. This composition makes it possible to employ in one salvo and in one aerial sortie about 300-400 nuclear warheads; an army up to 25-30.

133. Delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons -- to a depth of a front, up to 500 kilometers; for an army, up to 250 kilometers and more.

134. With artillery, a front and army have the capability on selected sectors to create a density of 80-90 guns per kilometer of front; with reinforcement, up to 100-110 guns and mortars. With tanks on the strike sectors, there can be created a density of 40-50 per kilometer, and with a tank army, up to 60-70 tanks.

135. The capabilities of air defense have also increased.

136. The goal of an offensive operation of a front will be to defeat the main missile, aviation and ground groupings of the enemy, disrupt his mobilization measures, occupy the more important operational-strategic areas in the theater of military operations and eliminate individual countries of the hostile coalition from the war.

137. The goal of an army operation is to defeat the opposing grouping of the enemy along with his nuclear resources in the entire depth of the disposition of the army group and occupy the important areas and objectives in the depth, which are specified for accomplishment of the immediate tasks of the front.

138. The offensive operation of a tank army is conducted in the entire depth of the operation of the front

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with the purpose of defeating the opposing groupings and deep reserves of the enemy and occupying the vitally important objectives and areas along the axis of its advance.

139. To achieve the goal of the operation of the front and army, tasks are specified in the first nuclear strike to frustrate a possible intrusion on the part of the enemy; both immediate and follow-up tasks.

140. The goal, immediate and follow-up tasks of a front and army in operations with employment and without employment of nuclear weapons will be identical. Only the tempo may vary.

Content of the Tasks

141. The initial nuclear strike of a front (and army) is to destroy the nuclear resources of the enemy, to reflect decisive destruction on the main groupings of troops, aircraft, and air defense, and also to destroy the most important control points and installations of the rear.

142. The immediate task of a front is to destroy nuclear means of attack, defeat the main forces of his army group, occupy areas which will destroy his operational stability -- a depth of 250-350 kilometers or more.

143. The follow-up tasks of a front are to destroy newly discovered means of nuclear attack of the enemy, defeat his deep reserves, occupy objectives and areas, the seizure of which constitutes achievement of the goal of the operation -- a depth of 300-500 kilometers or more.

144. The content of these tasks may be to eliminate particular countries from the war.

145. For an army, the content of the tasks may be:

Immediate -- destruction of the means of nuclear attack, defeat of the main forces of the army corps of the first echelon and the nearest operational reserves and occupation of areas, the seizure of which disrupts the operational stability of the enemy and creates conditions for a successful advance. Depth is 100-150 kilometers.

Follow-up -- destruction of newly discovered means of nuclear attack, completion of the defeat of the opposing forces and occupation of areas, the seizure of which fulfills the goals of the army operation. Depth is 150-200 kilometers.

146. Depth of a front operation - up to 600-800 kilometers  
an army - up to 250-350 kilometers

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Tempo without nuclear weapons - up to 30-50 kilometers a day  
with nuclear weapons - up to 60-80 kilometers a day  
Duration without nuclear weapons - up to 15-25 days  
with nuclear weapons - up to 8-12 days  
Army without nuclear weapons - 7-12 days  
with nuclear weapons - 4-5 days  
Width of the zone of a front - 300-500 kilometers  
of an army - 80-100 kilometers or more.

Question 2

Preparation of an Offensive Operation  
of a Front and Army

A) Conditions and Content of Preparation of an Offensive Operation

147. This is a complex of measures conducted by the command, staffs, chiefs of arms of troops, etc. The most important of these are:

- arriving at a decision and elaboration of a plan;
- assigning tasks to troops and training them;
- engineer preparation of the departure position of the troops;
- accumulation and allocation of material resources;
- organization and conduct of political work;
- organization of all types of the support and control of troops;
- maintenance of constant high combat readiness of troops for the accomplishment of assigned tasks.

148. The initial information needed for preparation of an operation is the following: goal of the operation and tasks of the front, and existing composition of forces - evaluation of the data. Preparation is carried out during peacetime. Subsequent data in the course of the first operation. All measures are conducted covertly.

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B) Adopting Decisions

149. This is the foundation for conduct of all measures for their preparation and execution. A decision must be comprehensive and well grounded. For this it is necessary to comprehend the concept of the senior commander, correctly define the goals and tasks of the operation and evaluate the situation.

150. To define the task is to understand correctly the goals and tasks of the operation, the place and role of the front and the army in the operation.

151. Evaluation of the situation includes an analysis of the following elements:

- the enemy;
- one's own troops (and those of neighboring units);
- the terrain;
- the radiation, chemical and bacteriological situation;
- the social and class make-up of the populace;
- the economic status of the area;
- hydrometeorological conditions;
- the time of year and day.

The command evaluates how these elements will affect the accomplishment of the tasks of the operation.

152. The enemy -- ascertain his capability to employ nuclear weapons, the composition and grouping of troops, intention and concept of operations, weak and strong aspects. Determine the methods to effect defeat, the major axis, objectives for the first nuclear strike.

153. One's own troops -- their capabilities to conduct operations, evaluate the operational position and status.

154. In the decisions are specified:

- the concept of the operation, its tasks, objectives and employment of nuclear weapons;
- tasks of combined-arms armies and tank armies (divisions);
- tasks of rocket troops, artillery and the air army;

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- airborne (amphibious) forces;
- tasks of air defense and the various reserves;
- important problems of joint action.

C) Planning the Operation

155. This is a matter for the staff. They work out in detail all elements of the decision of the commander-in-chief, the sequence and methods for accomplishment of tasks are established, assignments are made to troops and material resources are distributed; the procedure for joint action is established.

156. When preparing the first offensive of the operation, it is necessary to plan in detail the methods for warding off an aerial penetration by the enemy.

- the initial nuclear strike of a front;
- procedure for accomplishment of tasks without employment of nuclear weapons and advance of troops following the first nuclear strike by strategic forces, forces of the front and army.

157. In order to repel a possible penetration by the enemy, a grouping of troops is created at the departure position and the following tasks are determined:

- forces of combat security (cover) are detailed;
- the procedure for bringing troops to the departure position is determined;
- engineer preparation of its positions, areas.

158. The initial nuclear strike is planned for the purpose of destroying those means of nuclear attack of the enemy which have been discovered, inflicting destruction on his troops, aviation, air defense, control points. Planning is by objectives up to the boundary line for strikes by strategic rocket troops -- 400 kilometers. Planning is specific -- who, where, what yield, time, etc.

159. With employment only of conventional means, the procedure is established in detail for hitting each of the groupings with strikes by aircraft, artillery fire and rapid actions by tank and motorized rifle troops.

160. Greatest detail of planning is devoted to actions of troops for the first day and for accomplishment of the immediate tasks of the front and army. ✓

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161. In planning the operations, detailed calculations are made of the balance of forces in the entire zone and by axes.

162. Planning is formalized in a plan of an offensive operation which consists of the following:

- the operational part of the plan;
- plans for employment of the arms of troops and the air army;
- plans according to types of support for combat actions;
- organization of control and communications;
- plan of political work.

163. The plan for an offensive operation of a front and army -- (the operational part) is depicted graphically on a map 1:500,000 or 1:200,000; (for an army -- 1:200,000 or 1:100,000) with an explanatory note. The following are presented graphically:

- the grouping of forces of the enemy and the possible nature of his actions;
- operational disposition of troops in the departure position;
- immediate and follow-up tasks, their content, depth, time period, rate of advance without nuclear weapons and with nuclear weapons;
- the axis of the main and other strikes;
- tasks and objectives of nuclear strikes in the initial nuclear strike;
- objectives for employment of chemical weapons;
- axis of strikes and tasks of the armies (army corps and divisions);
- breakthrough of the line;
- procedure for committing the second echelon;
- composition, tasks, and areas for assault landings;
- launchers and their movement.

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D) Preparation of Troops and the Departure Position  
Before Initiation of Combat Actions

164. This work includes the following:

- assignment of tasks to the troops and organization of coordination;
- conduct of reconnaissance;
- training of staffs and combat training of troops;
- engineer preparation of the departure position;
- measures for training in the control of troops;
- comprehensive support for their combat activity.

165. In military districts, only a narrow circle of individuals is familiar with the plan -- the chiefs of directorates of the staff of the front, chiefs of the arms of troops and services for the part that concerns them. In a front, planning is also done for the armies, and operational groups participate.

166. Extracts from the directive are stored in the safe of the army commander and are not distributed to the large units, but only sent as packets for opening upon signal.

167. An important problem is the organization of joint action. Detailed organization is set up for the period of the initial nuclear strike, for the first days of the offensive and for accomplishment of the tasks of blocking a possible thrust by the enemy.

168. Organization of joint action for the initial nuclear strike between rocket troops and air forces: objectives and targets of nuclear strikes, yield of warheads, types of burst and the time are agreed upon.

169. Large units are covered and ready for attack at the moment of the initial nuclear strike.

170. For the first day of the offensive without employment of nuclear weapons, agreement is reached as to time and procedure for overflight of aircraft and crossing by troops of national borders, procedure for overcoming the zone of air defense by aircraft and routing covering troops.

171. The procedure is worked out for bringing our troops to the forward line of defense of the enemy.

172. Preparation of the departure position of troops just before the initiation of military operations is a

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function of the high combat readiness of rocket troops, air forces and groupings of troops of the enemy and his capabilities for a sudden nuclear strike.

173. Engineer preparation increases the viability of troops. The most thorough engineer preparation must be made in areas along the axes of the enemy's strikes. This defense should be deeply echeloned with a well-developed network of positions and lines.

174. Divisions of the first echelon prepare the first zone of defense (20-40 kilometers from the national border) to exclude hits by artillery on the troops and attenuate the strikes of his tactical nuclear resources.

175. Before the forward zone there are prepared positions for units of combat security 3 to 5 kilometers from the border; here there are positions for artillery and divisional missiles.

176. Divisions of the second echelon are at a distance of 60-80 kilometers from the border for creation of the second zone of defense.

177. The second echelon and reserves of the front are assigned areas of concentration.

178. Bringing troops up to areas of the departure position is done at the direction of the Supreme High Command.

E) Organization of Support for Combat Operations and Control of Troops

179. This is a most important factor in achievement of success. The types of support are the following:

- intelligence;
- operational camouflage;
- protection of troops and rear area objectives from nuclear strikes;
- engineer support;
- radioelectronic countermeasures;
- chemical, hydrometeorological, topo-geodetic and rear support.

180. This is organized by direction of the commander-in-chief and worked out by the chief of staff. Emphasis is on:

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- intelligence;
- protection against mass destruction;
- operational camouflage;
- radioelectronic countermeasures, hydrometeorological and topo-geodetic. Other forms by the chiefs of special troops:

181. Control of Troops in an Operation

- planning preparation and deployment of control points;
- procedure for their displacement in the course of the operation;
- preparation and engineer installations - control points; communications centers;
- maintenance of a high level of readiness of staffs.

182. The following control points are created:

- KP -- command post
- PKP -- forward command post
- TPU -- rear control point
- VPU -- auxiliary control point

System of Communications

F) Maintenance of High Combat Readiness of Troops

183. Constant combat readiness:

Troops are occupied with daily planned activity.

184. Increased combat readiness:

This is the degree of readiness from which it is possible to make the transition to full combat readiness in the shortest possible time. All units return to their garrisons. Duty means are strengthened and serve at full combat readiness. Officers are called back from leave and live in garrison. Guard is reinforced at installations. Twenty-four-hour-a-day duty in the staffs.

185. Full combat readiness:

This is readiness for immediate accomplishment of tasks -- carried out by means of the combat alert signal -- transition to wartime TO/E -- units are brought up to strength.

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Part of the forces march out to reinforce cover of national boundaries. Aircraft are dispersed.

Question 3

Conduct of an Offensive Operation

with Employment of Nuclear Weapons

186. Such operations are initiated with the first nuclear strike, which should bring decisive defeat to the enemy in his entire depth.

187. Methods for conduct of the operation and defeat of individual groupings of the enemy can vary.

188. In speaking of the methods of waging an operation, one has in view the procedure for utilization of forces and resources to defeat the opposing groupings and reserves of the enemy in the entire zone and in the entire depth of the operation.

189. The basis of these methods will be coordinated employment of nuclear weapons for a decisive blow against the enemy.

190. The main method will be the delivery of a decisive blow against the enemy by the surprise execution of a mass nuclear strike and rapid advance of tank and motorized rifle troops; airborne troops along the shortest axes to areas for achievement of the goals of the operation; centers of resistance are blocked off and bypassed.

191. There can also be employed a method whereby the offensive is conducted on converging axes in order to encircle and destroy the main forces of the enemy, using the forces of armies and fronts, or else in joint actions with neighboring fronts with simultaneous advance into the depth.

192. On a maritime axis, strikes along the seacoast, cutting off the main grouping from the sea, scattering it piecemeal.

193. The main method for defeat of the enemy is delivery of mass or grouped nuclear strikes in combination with other resources.

194. In some instances groupings can be destroyed by chemical weapons alone. Conventional resources alone can be used against small groups of the enemy, in the rear area and on the flanks.

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A) Delivery of the Initial Nuclear Strike

195. This is executed by a previously elaborated plan and is the launch of all combat-ready missiles and mass takeoff of aircraft of the front.


196. The most advantageous variant of this is when the strike is executed by the strategic rocket troops. In this case, the strike of the forces of the fronts will supplement the strategic means of nuclear attack.

197. But the readiness of the resources of the fronts is inferior to that of strategic rocket troops, and probably the initial nuclear attack of the front will be executed following the strike of strategic forces. It is necessary to shorten the gap in time between them or make them simultaneous.

198. Launch of front missiles is 5 to 8 minutes after the strategic rocket troops launch -- in order that the strike be simultaneous, aircraft become airborne with the launch of the missiles of strategic designation. This version ensures the greatest surprise. In an air army, 30 percent of duty resources -- act against the missile resources of the enemy and their system of control.

199. According to degree of readiness -- strikes are delivered.

200. To be kept in mind -- security of one's own troops. Secure separation of them from the epicenters of nuclear explosions.



If troops have not been warned about nuclear bursts, then their separation distance is doubled.

201. Corrections must be entered in the table for the first nuclear strike. Decisive superiority over the enemy is to be achieved.

B) Measures for Restoration of Combat Effectiveness of Troops

202. During the time of the initial nuclear strike, or after it, troops will have to ward off attack by the enemy from the air, and possibly penetration by his ground groupings.

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203. Warding off mass flights of aircraft and pilotless resources of the enemy can commence with commitment to battle of fighter aircraft and powerful strikes by antiaircraft missile units of air defense.

204. Depending on the degree of combat readiness, either all resources conduct fire or according to degree of readiness.

205. The enemy must be hit at distant approaches to our troops.

206. As a result of the nuclear strikes, there may be radical changes in conditions and the situation. Therefore, measures must be taken to liquidate the effects of nuclear attack and fulfill assigned tasks.

207. Acquire data on the condition of the troops and the radiation situation, determine losses and organize fulfillment of tasks.

208. Troops must go over to the offensive. When there are great losses, the main attention should be devoted to:

- identification of combat-effective large units and units, assignment to them of tasks for the offensive (or resistance);
- restoration of combat effectiveness of large units and units of all arms of troops directly connected with the necessity to carry out organizational measures for execution of extensive maneuvering of troops, with stocks of material and technical resources, rescue work, creation of conditions to assure fulfillment of combat tasks.

209. Withdrawal from centers of resistance -- creation of separate detachments. Restoration of control.

C) Shift of the Troops to the Offensive

210. This will depend on the results of the initial nuclear strikes of the sides, successful actions of air defense troops and the nature of the enemy's actions. The initial nuclear strike should be utilized.

211. With the shift to the offensive, troops may meet with the necessity to conduct meeting engagements, break through defenses, pursue and destroy the enemy, frustrate his counterstrikes.

212. Troops will have to overcome various barriers, zones of contamination, force water obstacles, occupy populated points and areas.

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213. It is not excluded that a front in the course of an offensive operation will be obliged to assume the defensive with part of its forces on particular axes.

D) Defeating the Enemy in the Border Zone

214. First of all, troops must defeat the opposing grouping of the enemy in the border zone.

215. Decisive destruction by the initial nuclear strike and conclusive defeat (of surviving groups) is completed by repeated nuclear strikes and the actions of the advancing troops.

216. But radical changes in the situation may require review or refinement of the methods of action of troops in defeating the groupings of the enemy located in the border zone.

217. Conditions for the defeat can vary:

- when the enemy is crushed -- only isolated groups -- not combat-effective -- then our troops will rush into the depth in pre-combat or march order.
- when both sides have suffered losses -- then nuclear strikes against the enemy -- restoration of combat readiness and a decisively forward move.
- but it may also be necessary to organize defense in isolated sectors.

E) Development of the Offensive

218. This is understood to mean increasing efforts by troops on decisive axes, increased rates of advance - for rapid arrival in the area where the goal of the operation is achieved.

219. For successful development of an offensive, repeated nuclear strikes are delivered against the groupings and installations of the enemy.

220. Tank armies and tank divisions will be the routine force of strike groupings operating on the decisive axes; they are powerful, maneuverable, stable and can operate following nuclear strikes; they can deliver strikes against the flanks and rear of the enemy.

Commitment to Combat of Second Echelons and Reserves

221. Rapid actions will require reinforcement of the first echelon of engaged troops with reserves of the armies and fronts.

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222. This can occur while crushing groupings of the enemy which are counterattacking and moving forward, and in transferring the efforts of troops to other axes, and also in cases when particular advancing groupings suffer large losses from nuclear strikes by the enemy and it becomes necessary to create new groupings, and when the balance of forces evolves to our disadvantage.

223. An army of the second echelon of a front can be committed to battle upon completion of the immediate tasks or with the initiation of accomplishment of the following tasks -- it is designated to fulfill tasks on the main axis.

224. It is to be committed in an organized fashion -- with nuclear strikes, into the gaps between armies of the first echelon, in sectors weakly covered by enemy troops, simultaneously or in sequence, with all forces or part of its forces.

225. The second echelon reserves are in readiness for fulfillment of new tasks.

Employment of Airborne and Amphibious Assaults

226. These are of importance in defeating the enemy; they can vary. Within the framework of an army - tactical -

- destruction of the means of nuclear destruction;
- defeat of small groupings;
- interdict accomplishment of a movement;
- cooperation with divisions of the first echelon;
- occupation of road junctions;
- seizure of crossings;
- overcome zones of contamination.

227. The army must be reinforced with helicopters.

228. There have been created air assault brigades -- they are being studied.

229. Operational airborne assaults:

- completion of defeat;
- seize and destroy nuclear weapons;
- airfield centers, depots, arsenals;

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- isolation of the enemy from the flow of reserves;
- occupation of areas of crossings;
- destruction of control points;

A front can support them with nuclear strikes.

230. Radiation:

Once in the course of 4 days -- 50 r  
Repeatedly in the course of 10-30 days -- 100 r  
three months -- 200 r  
in the course of a year -- 300 r

Question 4

Conduct of an Offensive Operation

Without Employment of Nuclear Weapons

231. Success in an operation employing conventional resources depends on:

- gaining air supremacy;
- superiority of forces over the enemy;
- achievement of surprise in the air strike;

A) Disruption of an Attack by the Enemy

232. This will be a most important task which can be achieved by the actions of several fronts, air forces, air defense forces and of the navy within the framework of a strategic operation.

233. Methods for disruption vary; they will depend on the situation, balance of forces and combat readiness.

234. It is achieved by a surprise pre-emptive strike or meeting engagement against an enemy preparing to attack, or going over to the defensive on his main axes -- the most advantageous is a strike.

235. But when he pre-empts us in deployment -- go over to temporary defense.

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B) Methods of Conducting an Operation and Defeating Groupings of the Enemy

236. The main methods for conducting an offensive operation can be the following:

- delivery of strikes on one or several axes in order to split the enemy and defeat him piecemeal, or delivery of strikes on converging axes in order to encircle the main forces of the enemy and destroy them, with simultaneous development of the offensive into the depth for occupation of areas where the goal of the operation is achieved.

237. This is accomplished by destroying the groupings of the enemy with artillery fire and aircraft, penetration of his defenses or destroying him in meeting engagements and subsequent development of the offensive into the depth and in the direction of the flanks; encirclement and destruction can be with other fronts (or armies) or with the forces of one front (or army).

238. On the coast -- a strike along the coast.

239. In all cases, the main thing is:

- utilization of resources and strike forces of the troops;
- massing of forces and resources on the main axes;
- destruction with artillery and air forces;
- rapid actions by tank and motorized rifle troops in conjunction with airborne landings.

240. It is necessary to organize continual blows at the enemy both along the front and in the depth - this arises from the limited capabilities of conventional means of destruction.

C) Shift of Troops of a Front (Army) to the Offensive

241. This is always executed from the departure position. It can occur while in immediate contact with the enemy and can be at a distance of 20-40 kilometers from the border. The transition can be from the areas of assembly for the alert, if the enemy has invaded.

242. Just prior to launch of an offensive there must be fire preparation (artillery fire and air forces). The targets are means of nuclear attack, artillery, tanks, manpower, control points, etc.

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243. Defeat of covering units, if they are not large, is by forward detachments.

244. The main forces of divisions are at this time in the columns of their deployment in pre-combat formations -- to the extent necessary -- depending on the resistance of the enemy.

245. But when the border is covered by an enemy who is stronger, it may be necessary to deploy the main forces of the divisions of the first echelon.

246. Defeat of the main forces of the enemy can be achieved in a meeting engagement.

D) Defeat of the Enemy in a Meeting Engagement

247. This is characterized by an intense struggle to gain time, seizing and holding the initiative, availability of limited time to organize combat actions; sharp and rapid changes in the situation; brief duration of combat actions; commitment of troops from the march, and extensive use of maneuver.

248. The decisive factor is pre-empting the enemy in delivery of air and artillery strikes against the main forces.

249. Combat actions should be preceded by artillery preparation -- brief (when the enemy is not under cover) 10-15 minute, but powerful fire barrage.

250. The main thing is to crush the enemy piecemeal and create superiority over him on the axes of the strikes.

251. Great importance will be attached to rapid maneuvering by large units and units moving against the flanks and rear of the enemy. When this is not possible, it will be necessary to crush the enemy by means of frontal strikes, scattering and destroying him piecemeal.

252. In all cases, it will be necessary to strive to:

- contain the movement of the enemy;
- pre-empt his move to advantageous lines;
- deliver a pre-emptive strike by aircraft and artillery;
- unexpectedly and decisively attack tank and motorized rifle units on the flanks and rear;
- stop any attempt to assume the defensive.

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E) Defeat of Groupings of the Enemy Which Have Gone Over to Defensive Actions

253. Our troops may encounter the enemy's defense in the border zone and in the depth. It will be necessary to destroy them.

254. Defense can vary. Prepared ahead of time. He is preparing it even now -- nuclear mines.

255. Defeat of such an enemy will require:

- painstaking preparation;
- reliable neutralization of his forces in the sector of the breakthrough and on the flanks;
- neutralization by aircraft of his immediate reserves, artillery and control points;
- decisive actions by tank and motorized rifle troops of the first echelon;
- execution of an uninterrupted fire support for advancing troops and timely increase of efforts.

256. It will be necessary to create overwhelming superiority on selected axes but assume the threat of employment of nuclear resources.

257. All forces and resources are brought in for fire preparation.

258. When the enemy goes over to the defensive on the front line (20-25 kilometers from the border), then conditions will be difficult for the troops. The enemy can use his 175-mm and 155-mm guns to deliver strikes to a depth of 20 kilometers, and 12 kilometers from the forward edge of the line of defense.

259. The main force will then be aircraft. Attack against the defense at "H" hour as units rapidly break through the forward edge of defense and penetrate into the depth, destroying as they go.

260. The rate of penetration will depend on the degree of neutralization.

261. Defeating the enemy piecemeal - it is necessary to use all means to isolate the areas which are being defended and destroy them - but rapidly develop the advance into the depth; destroy the reserves there - and not allow them to proceed to the areas of combat actions.

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262. Advance along axes bypassing the enemy's strong-points, not allowing him organized occupation of lines in the depth.

F) Forcing Water Obstacles

263. Troops will have to overcome water obstacles. This should be executed unexpectedly and from the march on a broad front as the troops arrive at the water obstacle - and develop the offensive.

264. An important task is to defeat the enemy even before the approach to the water obstacle and not allow him up to the egress from the water line and destroy reserves located beyond the water obstacle.

265. Air strikes against means of nuclear attack, departing groupings (collected at crossings), airborne assaults.

266. Preparation - sectors for forcing, procedure for approach of troops to a river; bringing up resources for landing and crossing.

267. Organization of command service - control points are covered. An important task is seizing bridges (amphibious assaults, forward detachments).

G) Development of the Offensive

268. For this it is necessary to take all measures to increase efforts of troops along the main axes in order to frustrate attempts by the enemy to organize a defense.

269. For this it is necessary to utilize all forces and resources - even airborne assaults. Seize important objectives in the rear area.

270. Breaking up counterstrikes which are being prepared, and if not - parry them with an answering strike, or push them aside and move rapidly into the depth.

H) Transition to Nuclear Weapons

271. This is probable in a situation where the main groupings of the enemy's first echelon have been defeated, the troops approach vitally important areas and the enemy is not in condition to restrain further advance of our troops.

272. Intelligence is very important. It is necessary to pre-empt the enemy in a nuclear strike. Strikes against objectives near our troops (3, 5, 10 kt).

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Seminar on the Topic

Combat Employment of Rocket Troops and  
Artillery in an Offensive Operation of a Front and Army

Question One

Bringing Rocket Troops to Full Combat Readiness

273. Under conditions of a nuclear war, the success of an offensive operation will be influenced decisively by the actions of strategic nuclear forces (strategic rocket troops - medium and long-range) to crush the main grouping of enemy troops in the theater of military operations.

274. These strikes, in the interests of security for our troops, cannot be delivered closer than a definite line (150-200 kilometers from forward units.)

275. Destroying the grouping immediately opposing the front is the responsibility of resources of the front.

276. The main means for destroying the enemy in the initial nuclear strike is the rocket troops. In peacetime they are maintained in constant combat readiness. They can be called on for the initial nuclear strike without advance mobilization. ✓

277. The chief of rocket troops and artillery organizes storage of a certain quantity of missiles, warheads and fuel; he organizes the selection of site areas, their topographic-geodetic fix, and prepares roads.

278. To cut down on the time for bringing rocket troops and artillery to full combat readiness, they can be shifted to increased combat readiness, i.e., one from which they can occupy site areas in a briefer time span.  
Measures:

- filling up with fuel, bringing the missiles to the battalions;
- transfer of missiles to launchers;
- assignment to combat duty;
- moving distant battalions up to the border;
- preparing launchers for operation.

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279. Full combat readiness -

Rocket units are located in site areas, have their combat assignment and are ready for launch.

This is executed as a rule on the signal for combat alert.

280. Missiles in site areas are in readiness numbers 3, 2, 2a or 1. Missiles which have coordinates are in readiness 1; the rest are in 2 and 2a.

281. Site regions may be designated near places of permanent location (10-20 kilometers), but if they are capable of accomplishing tasks from there, then 2.5-3 hours are needed, while movement to the border from remote places takes 8-10 hours.

Question 2

Composition, Grouping, Tasks and Basic

Principles of Combat Employment of Rocket Troops

in an Offensive Operation of a Front and Army

282. ~~Combat strength is established in peacetime.~~  
This depends on the place and role, and also on the tasks which can be accomplished by strategic rocket troops.

In a division -- a battalion - four launchers (R-30, R-65)

In an army -- a brigade - 9 launchers (R-170, R-300)

In a front -- a brigade - 12 launchers (R-300)

283. The number of launchers is of importance in the initial nuclear strike in regard to who will employ the most in the initial salvo.

284. A front on an important axis of a theater of military operations may have in its complement the following:

- one or two front rocket brigades      12-24 launchers
- three to five army rocket brigades      27-45 launchers
- 25-30 battalions                              75-90 launchers

Total                      114-159 launchers  
(including 39-69 operational-tactical)

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285. Rocket units are subordinate to the commander-in-chief and not included in the groups.

286. To furnish missiles for rocket large units and units, a front may have:

- one or two front mobile missile technical brigades (PRTB) - to furnish missiles to units and large units of front subordination and to reinforce the army PRTB.
- one or two missile-park battalions to transport missiles and warheads to the PRTB. In addition, in each army there is an army PRTB to furnish missiles to the army missile brigade and missile battalions of the divisions.

287. Resources of a front can strike from the immediate tactical depth up to 260 kilometers and destroy various targets.

288. Rocket troops can accomplish the following tasks:

- destroy means of nuclear attack;
- hit enemy troop groupings;
- disorganize troop control;
- weaken the air defense system;
- disrupt the work of the rear area;
- hamper troop movements (bridges, crossings).

\* 289. On a maritime axis, in joint action with naval forces it can destroy groupings of the fleet, assault forces, bases, islands, etc.

290. Principles of employment of rocket troops:

- massively -- in the interests of accomplishing the main task: to change the balance of forces;
- suddenly, in good time -- intelligence, constant readiness, supply of missiles, decision;
- take into account the capabilities of each large unit and unit and employ effectively.
- plan according to time, objectives, place, taking into account strategic rocket troops.

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291. For reliable damage to objectives, the following are required:

- a division in an area of concentration - 6-7 missiles 100 kt
- guided missile launchers and aircraft on an airfield - one missile 40-100 kt
- major control point - one missile 100 kt
- strongpoint of a battalion - one 110 kt or three 10-20 kt missiles.

292. The commander-in-chief makes the decision. This is the basis for planning, where the utilization of rocket troops (each missile) is already elaborated in detail.

293. The chief of rocket troops and artillery may report on the following:

- the composition of rocket troops, supply of missiles and capability to deliver strikes;
- possible objectives for destruction by rocket troops, taking into account strategic rocket troops and air forces;
- possible time periods of readiness of rocket troops and necessary measures to assure this;
- procedure for increasing the degree of readiness of rocket troops and execution of the first nuclear strike;
- necessary measures to organize intelligence and re-reconnaissance of targets to be hit by missiles.

294. Planning for utilization of rocket troops of a front and army is done on maps with a scale of 1:500,000 (1:200,000 for an army) with a brief explanatory note.

295. After confirmation by the commander-in-chief, the following are done:

- supply of missiles is organized;
- selection and preparation of site areas;
- organization for moving up and deploying;
- organization of joint actions;
- support for combat actions of rocket troops and organization of control.

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296. The plan is the main document of rocket troops and artillery - it is constantly refined.

Question 3

Employment of Rocket Troops in an  
Initial Nuclear Strike by a Front

297. On this depends the defeat of the enemy and consequently the outcome of the operation; it is executed by rocket troops jointly with air forces. But the decisive role belongs to the rocket troops, especially against points of permanent disposition. This role is determined by:

- the element of surprise of the strike;
- reliability of delivery does not depend on air defense;
- independent of weather, time of day, etc.

298. In the initial nuclear strike there can be achieved a decisive change in the balance of forces, and the troops get the opportunity to launch a rapid offensive on a broad front.

299. Planning of an initial nuclear strike of a military district. The chief of rocket troops and artillery participates. It is centralized -- here there are more data on the enemy.

300. The commander-in-chief--in his decision for an initial nuclear strike determines:

- the composition of the rocket troops to be brought into the initial nuclear strike;
- the expenditure of missiles with nuclear and chemical charges; *dw*
- the specific objectives to be hit;
- type of burst and yield of the nuclear charges;
- procedure and time periods for bringing up units to be used in the first strike;
- procedure for destroying mobile objectives;
- time for delivery of strikes and control signals.

301. For a divisional battalion the objectives can be stated or only the expenditure of missiles; in this case the commander of the army plans the objectives.

302. For rocket troops in an initial nuclear strike, the following objectives may be planned:

- delivery aircraft on airfields and missiles on launchers;
- nuclear weapon and fuel depots;
- major control points and control centers;
- main troop groupings of the enemy (tank);
- air defense units on the axis of operation of air forces;
- the most important rear area objectives (road junctions).

303. The nature of the tasks is determined by the characteristics of the missiles. The overall scope of the tasks depends on the sum of combat capabilities of rocket units being used in the initial nuclear strike.

304. Each launch battery receives a specific objective for destruction, coordinates of aiming points, yield of the nuclear charge, type and height of burst, and also the order of the burst; for destruction of mobile targets, it is received from re-reconnaissance resources.

305. Planning of an initial nuclear strike in the staff of rocket troops and artillery is formalized as a graphic of preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike; from this, extracts are given to the armies and units, where they are stored in safes.

306. Procedure for the initial nuclear strike can vary:

- delivery of the strike against troops of the enemy who are located at points of permanent disposition, and other stationary objectives;
- delivery of the strike against planned objectives under conditions of deployment of enemy troops;
- the alternative possibility is also not excluded that by the time of commencement of the initial nuclear strike, not all launch batteries participating in it have been brought to full combat readiness.

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307. But it may be that a war will begin without an initial nuclear strike. Then the plan will be systematically refined. Under these conditions, a front will not have full centralization of planning and execution of the initial nuclear strike. Part of the measures will be in the armies and divisions.

308. The FRONT: organization of reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance of objectives for operational-tactical missiles, determination of expenditure of missiles, procedure for increasing the degree of combat readiness, planning for movement of missiles.

309. ARMY: reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance, readiness of the brigade for utilization, planning for division resources.

310. DIVISION: reconnaissance, readiness of divisional missiles.

Question 4

Organization of Supply of Missiles to Rocket Troops

Prior to and in the Course of an Operation

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Question 5

Combat Employment of Artillery in an Operation

311. In operations which begin without employment of nuclear resources, an important condition for success is gaining fire superiority on the field of battle. For this it is necessary to create superiority in fire resources, particularly in artillery and air forces.

312. Prior to an attack with tanks, we must destroy the enemy with fire -- his nuclear resources, artillery, antitank resources, etc.

313. Artillery will fulfill these tasks with great success in the tactical depth.

314. In modern operations without employment of nuclear resources, artillery is the main firepower of the ground forces. More is demanded of artillery at present and the number of tasks has grown:

- destruction of tactical nuclear resources of the enemy;

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- support of movement and deployment of the large units of the first echelon of an army and overcoming covering units;
- destruction of opposing large units of the enemy first echelon while breaking through the defense line;
- warding off counterattacks and counterstrikes;
- support for forcing of water obstacles;
- supporting commitment of the second echelon to battle.

315. Artillery fulfills its tasks by destroying and neutralizing the means of nuclear attack, his artillery, tanks, personnel, firepower, control points and installations of the troop rear area.

316. For these operations, the basic principles for employment of artillery will be:

- massing the artillery on the most important axes;
- close collaboration with ground forces and air forces;
- continuity of fire support of troops.

317. Massing--in the direction of the main axis, where there is a breakthrough in the enemy's defense, where 60-70% of the artillery of the army must be concentrated. After fulfillment of tasks - rapidly disperse.

318. Features of combat employment of artillery under these conditions:

- significant volume of tasks - (necessary forces);
- powerful preparation for breaking through the defense (necessary to bring in artillery from the 2nd echelon of the army, even from the front);
- the necessity for reliable destruction of all targets with conventional munitions. Expenditure of them increases.

Requirements of Front and Army for Artillery

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319. The strongest defense may be on the forward defensive perimeter [three words in parentheses illegible].

320. A front - may require two - three battalions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RSHC), while an army may require up to one artillery battalion from the RSHC. In addition, for the front and army there can be required two - three tank-destroyer brigades of the RSHC, which make it possible to cover a zone of 15-30 kilometers along a tank-threatened axis and repel a strike by one - two enemy tank divisions.

Allocation and Grouping of Artillery

321. Pursuant to the decision of the commander, artillery of the RSHC is attached to an army on the basis of calculated requirements. Long-range artillery is attached to a tank army.

322. In the course of an operation there are possible changes in the original disposition.

323. From the regular and the attached RSHC artillery there are created the following groupings:

- in the army - an army artillery group composed of 9 (?) or more battalions. An army artillery group can be divided into 3 sub-groups (in this number a battalion of the 1st echelon on the main axis). They can be resubordinated to the division.

- in a division on the main axis [word missing] division artillery group [word missing] artillery battalion. Included may be [six lines missing].

324. Most difficult will be for troops to shift to the offensive against the enemy defending the front line. When there exists a cover zone, one must advance in such a way as to be ready to disrupt possible counter-preparation by the enemy and to carry out our preparation.

- first to advance and deploy is the artillery of the forward detachments and vanguard, after it artillery reconnaissance;

- artillery groups of regiments in ready columns of their regiments;

- battalions of the army group and antitank companies, on independent routes at the level of regiments of the 1st echelon;

- army artillery groups at the level of the main forces of divisions of the 1st echelon on the main axis;

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- antitank companies of the army behind large units of the first echelon on tank-threatened axes;
- artillery of the RSHC - to be introduced into the zone of the army and resubordinated to first echelon divisions in the most threatened areas;
- antitank companies of a front are deployed along a tank-threatened axis and for reinforcement of artillery of a division - 2-3 hours, and to organize a breakthrough of the forward defensive line on the main axis of an army 4-6 hours, of which 2-3 [word missing] time.

Fire Preparation and Fire Support

325. It must be conducted [line missing] but in the course of an operation for breaking through the intermediate defensive lines of the enemy.

326. It is planned in the army and division. The front determines the artillery grouping, calculates the requirements for artillery and munitions and allocates them.

327. When fire planning is carried out in a division (battalions along various axes) the chief of rocket troops and artillery of the army is obliged to determine and indicate the following to the divisions:

- permissible expenditure of munitions for the main task;
- composition of the artillery of the 2nd echelon which can be called in for preparation and support;
- tasks which can be accomplished by the army on behalf of the division.

328. If a breakthrough along the main axis is to be executed by contiguous flanking divisions, then the staff of rocket troops and artillery of the army work out fire preparation.

329. Duration of the artillery preparation - it consists of one to three or more fire periods. For fire support the chief of rocket troops and artillery determines:

- method and depth of fire support;
- time for the start of opening fire;
- the number of artillery pieces from the army [3-4 words illegible];
- tasks of artillery [4-5 words illegible];

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- the sequence of [several words missing]

[Five lines missing.]

Seminar on the topic:

COMBAT ACTIONS OF AN AIR ARMY IN AN OFFENSIVE  
OF A FRONT

Question 1

Fundamentals of Combat Actions of an Air Army

330. The part played by an air army in an offensive operation is determined by the importance of those tasks which it is capable of fulfilling in support of a given operation.

331. A great quality it possesses is that it is capable of effectively striking the enemy in small-sized installations which require the strike to be timely, powerful and highly precise. In the area of a front, such targets can be 70 percent and more.

332. An air army [four lines missing].

333. Under conditions of operations without nuclear weapons, the air army is the only resource available to the commander which is capable of hitting the enemy in the entire depth of his operational formation.

334. The tasks to be fulfilled by the air army are assigned by the front commander according to his concept of the conduct of the operation and the capabilities of the air army.

335. These tasks can be divided into groups:

a. Those accomplished on behalf of the front as a whole according to the plan of the front and the air army. The main ones are the following:

- cover of troops and rear area installations from air attacks and aerial reconnaissance;
- combating missile/nuclear and [word missing] means of attack;
- combating the operational reserves of the enemy;
- conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

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In addition, detection of [2-3 words missing] combating amphibious landings [2-3 words missing] airborne landings [8-10 words missing].

b. Overall [3-4 words missing] of the combined-arms army and tank army [3 lines missing] including:

[3 lines missing]

There can also be others, such as reconnoitering the terrain, laying down smoke screens, etc.

c. These tasks are carried out by the air army jointly with troops of the front in air operations of the air forces and long-range aviation, in airborne operations, and in cooperation with large units of long-range aviation and the air transport service, while overcoming the front-line air defense.

336. Of all the tasks, the main and constant ones are:

- covering troops and installations of the rear area against strikes by enemy air forces;
- combating missile nuclear and air forces;
- combating the reserves;
- air support for the combined-arms army and the tank army;
- conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

337. In the course of an operation, most of these tasks are fulfilled by the air army simultaneously and in collaboration with the rocket troops, independent antiaircraft artillery regiments and with air defense troops.

COMBAT COMPOSITION OF AN AIR ARMY

338. It is not constant, depending on [3 lines missing].

339. An air army can have the following: Two or three fighter, one or two fighter-bomber, and one bomber division, three or four aerial reconnaissance regiments, two or three squadrons of unpiloted reconnaissance aircraft, two or three helicopter regiments and several squadrons of auxiliary aircraft. In all there are up to 1,000 or more combat aircraft.

340. In the case where there are two divisions of fighter-bombers and one of bombers, an air army in one sortie using conventional weapons is capable of destroying 22-25 battalions of "Pershing" or "Sergeant", or 16-18 batteries of "Hawk", or 22-25 radio-electronic posts in the rear, control points, or up to eight squadrons of aircraft parked at airfields.

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341. It can neutralize 35-40 batteries of artillery, or batteries of free rockets or batteries of "Hawk" missiles, or 2-3 tank and 6-8 motorized rifle companies.

342. Using the forces of three squadrons of fighters it is capable of intercepting and destroying in the air up to 100 percent of enemy aircraft.

343. With employment of nuclear munitions the capabilities increase; for example, a warhead with a power of 150 kilotons [1-2 words missing] a strike of one division of bombers with conventional means of attack.

344. In an offensive [2-3 words missing] days an air army can [2-3 words missing] up to 40 percent of the installation [3-4 words missing]. [3 lines missing]

Basing of an Air Army and Execution by It of Airfield Maneuvers

345. Basing is the grouping, which means the composition and location of the forces of the air army in the zone of the front for accomplishment of tasks. Aircraft grouping is an element of the operational formation of a front and it must correspond to the design of the operation, to the combat actions of the air army and assure it a high degree of combat preparedness, massing of efforts on the principal axes, close collaboration with troops of the front and neighboring units and reliable control.

346. In order to increase the viability of an air army under conditions of nuclear attack, basing must be conducted by dispersal, and airfields should have shelters for personnel, control points, and aircraft.

347. Prior to the start of combat operations, air units disperse - fighters and fighter bombers within limits of 50-200 kilometers and bombers 150-350 kilometers from the national border. Each air regiment disperses to two airfields and unpiloted reconnaissance aircraft up to 20-30 kilometers from the national border.

348. The main airfields can prepare supplies and other reserves for dispersal and movement of aircraft.

[5 lines missing]

Combat Readiness of an Air Army

349. A constant threat poses a high requirement to maintain constant combat readiness. This is assured by:

- constant improvement and maintenance at high level both combat readiness and morale and political awareness of personnel;

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- timely development and timely refinement of plans for combat operations;
  - timely preparation of the airfield network, rear area organizations and control points;
  - constant readiness of large units and units for combat operations according to the plan of the initial nuclear strike and for warding off a sudden attack by enemy aircraft;
  - organization of rapid transmission of combat alerts to personnel of all units and [1 word missing] fulfillment of tasks after combat alert;
  - constant maintenance of combat readiness for [1 word missing] possible number of combat [2-3 words missing];
  - round-the-clock readiness of [2-3 words missing] means and communications;
  - organization of combat [15 words missing];
- [4 lines missing]

350. The degree of combat readiness is determined by the front commander. Increased combat readiness is to reduce the time periods for bringing air and rear area units and large units to full combat readiness.

351. When there is increased combat readiness, the command posts of units and large units mount round-the-clock duty watch for generals and officers, they are reinforced, and personnel are in barracks. Forward commands of air units with their resources proceed to dispersal airfields. Air units are located at permanent or reserve airfields.

352. Aerial bombs, missiles and shells are attached to the aircraft and fuses are set. Times for takeoff are set by the front commander. They can be - for a bomber regiment - (at two airfields) 10-15 minutes, for fighters and fighter-bombers - 9-28 (?) minutes;

353. Lightning combat readiness - this is a condition when they can proceed with the fulfillment of combat tasks. It is implemented by combat alert.

354. With full combat readiness, air units are dispersed and ready for takeoff to [two lines missing].

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Question 2

PREPARATION OF AN AIR ARMY FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A FRONT

355. This includes a large complex of measures which are carried out by the commander, the staff, the troops and the rear area. The main thing is definition of the task and adoption of a decision by the commander of the air army, assignment of tasks and planning of combat operations, organization of coordination, of control, basing and support for combat operations.

356. The decision of the commander is based on consideration of all levels. He adopts it [1-2 words missing]. Participating in drafting the decision are his deputies, the chief of staff and other chiefs and officers.

357. The basic elements for adopting a decision are: Tasks, [2-3 words missing]. As a result of the definition of tasks [1-2 words missing] situation, the commander of the air army [10-12 words missing].

358. . . . initial nuclear strike. . . .

[6 lines missing]

359. The decision of the air army commander includes:

- conclusions from the estimate on the enemy;
- concept of the combat operations;
- order of fulfillment of combat tasks;
- tasks for aerial reconnaissance;
- tasks for aviation large units and units for the first days of a war.

360. This decision is drawn up, as a rule, graphically on a map with a brief explanatory note, or else in written form.

361. Planning of the combat operations of an air army has as its purpose to determine the sequence of accomplishment of the main tasks of the army, to determine the forces and resources for accomplishment of such tasks and specify the methods of accomplishing them. Determine the order of coordination with troops of the front, of air defense, of long-range air forces and large units of the air army. Specify measures for combat, special and rear services support and on organization of control.

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362. On the basis of the decision of the commander of the air army and his orders, the plan of combat operations is drafted. This is a detailed plan for the air army. [7-9 words missing]

363. [4 lines missing]

- tasks of air units and large units.
- organization of coordination;
- organization of control.

364. The staff of the air army drafts specific plans for fulfillment of individual tasks which are enclosures to the plan for combat operations. For example:

- plan of combat operations of an air army for the initial nuclear strike of a front;

- planning table of combat operations of an air army in [3 words missing];

- the plan for combat operations of fighter aircraft of an air army in the air defense system of a front.

365. Nuclear strikes (60-65 percent) [2-3 words illegible] most immediate task of a front; of these, not less than 50 percent in the first nuclear strike. Distribution - means of nuclear attack up to 35-45 percent; for combating the reserves up to 25-35%; and for support of the combined-arms army and tank army 15-25 percent.

[15 lines missing]

366. Planning must take into account that by the time of the initiation of a strike, objectives may have changed their location. For each delivery vehicle there are two reserve targets, (while those without nuclear weapons have an area for independent search).

367. The plan for combat operations of an air army with conventional means is for the entire operation of the front. Tasks of the air army are planned according to the tasks of the front, in detail for the first day.

368. With employment of nuclear weapons, the combat operations of an air army are worked out for the first nuclear strike of the front.

Coordination of an Air Army with the Troops of the Front,  
with Air Defense and with Neighboring Air Armies

369. This is organized in peacetime. The greatest detail is for the first nuclear strike and for warding off the air enemy and for combat operations on the first day of the operation.

370. It is organized for correct allocation of tasks and determination of methods of their accomplishment, of a precise order of initial support and exchange of information.

371. Coordination of the air army with the combined-arms army and tank army consists of coordinating employment of nuclear weapons. . . .

[9 lines missing]

372. Coordination of an air army with rocket troops of a front is allocation of tasks and objectives for a nuclear strike by the army with neighboring air armies and for joint accomplishment of tasks for combating nuclear means, for destruction of major aviation groupings, warding off massed attacks, combating reserves, supporting airborne landing forces and conducting aerial reconnaissance.

373. With front air defenses and with national air defenses, and first of all to ward off a sudden attack by the air enemy with the initiation of military operations, alert warnings, limits of responsibility, methods for mutual transmittal of targets and control of [2-3 words missing] combat operations.

374. Preparation of an air army for combat operations of a front is difficult and time-consuming. Support of combat flights in an operation will require [1-2 words missing] 60,000 tons of diverse cargoes [2-3 words missing].

The organization of control [1-2 words missing]

375. [9 lines missing]

Question 3

CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS OF AN AIR ARMY

376. An air army delivers its first massed strike with all forces, in a unified operational structure consisting usually of two echelons and a reserve.

377. The takeoff can be timed to coincide with the initiation of the launch of rockets by the front. In this case, the approach of lead aircraft to the national border

is to be 7-10 minutes after the launch of the front's rockets, which will assure the security of air operations and surprise in the strike of the rockets. //

378. In the first echelon, the forces and resources are capable of assuring the delivery of secondary strikes by the main forces of an air army--the second echelon.

379. The tasks of the first echelon (support) include: Re-reconnaissance of objectives (coordinates of targets for rocket troops), guiding strike groups of air forces to targets, neutralizing air defense installations of the enemy.

[8 lines missing]

380. The second echelon is the strike element. It is basically composed of nuclear delivery aircraft which take off together with covering aircraft of first or second readiness behind aircraft of the first echelon.

381. Its task is to crush the objectives of the first strike decisively with nuclear weapons.

382. At the head of the second echelon will be 55 (?) percent of aircraft of tactical and almost all the aircraft of operational aerial reconnaissance at low altitudes (50-300 meters). Spacing between the aircraft will be 5-10 kilometers in order to have complete coverage of the terrain to a depth of 250-300 kilometers. (Calculations show that a simultaneous flight of 40-50 reconnaissance aircraft makes it possible to evaluate the composition and nature of activities of the enemy in the zone of the front at the beginning of an offensive and note objectives for strikes by air force and rocket troops.

383. The reserve of an air army follows after the second echelon at a 10-15 (?) -minute distance and consists of [3-4 words missing].

[12 lines missing]

384. . . . is not practiced. However, the flight of each group is regulated by flight path and time for crossing the synchronization line.

385. The echelons will consist of small groups and single aircraft dispersed along the entire zone of advance of the troops of the front, mainly at low and very low altitudes.

386. All the strike groups maintain contact with the appropriate crews of re-reconnaissance aircraft. In this network both the division commander and the air army commander give commands, in case it is necessary to retarget aircraft.

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Warding Off the First Air Raid of the Enemy

387. An air army carries out tasks to ward off attacks using fighter aircraft in coordination with front and national air defense.

388. It can be assumed that an enemy raid may occur day and night, with a large quantity of small groups, along a broad front, echeloned in altitude and depth, and employing jamming.

389. In the zone of a front can operate. . .

[8 lines missing]

390. The last echelons usually consist of carrier-borne and strategic aircraft, following the tactical aircraft at a distance of 15-20 minutes' flying time and more.

391. On the basis of a system of control of a number of simultaneously directed groups, and taking into account the depth of the enemy's formation--fighter aircraft of an air army will be committed to battle by echelons. There can be four or five such echelons. The first echelon is aircraft on duty in the air, the second echelon is for independent search and destruction of enemy aircraft at distant approaches to the national border. The third echelon is committed to battle at the first combat degree of readiness and operates with radar for guidance. The fourth echelon is in the zone waiting for an increase in radar efforts and the fifth echelon is in reserve (?).

392. The combat capabilities of the first [4 words missing] and the probability of interception of radar [2-3 words missing] at low altitudes [4-5 words missing] destruction at 35 percent (?) of enemy aircraft.

393. In instances where 20 percent of combat aircraft...

[10 lines missing]

Question 4

FEATURES OF THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF COMBAT

OPERATIONS OF AN AIR ARMY IN AN OFFENSIVE OF THE

TROOPS OF A FRONT WITHOUT EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

394. A war can start without employment of nuclear weapons. According to NATO views, the transition to employment of nuclear weapons can take place in the case when their troops are not in a position to achieve their assigned goals using conventional means or are placed under the threat of being destroyed. Thus, nuclear weapons can be

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employed at any time. In connection with this, there is constant readiness of rocket troops and air forces for employment of nuclear weapons in the course of combat operations.

395. The overall goal of an offensive of a front without employment of nuclear weapons will be to break up the offensive of the enemy, to defeat the main forces of his army groups, and above all the army corps of his first echelon with its nuclear resources, and seize important areas.

396. For successful achievement of the objective, strikes begin. . .

[7 lines missing]

397. . . .

- covering troops, rear area installations of a front, against air strikes and aerial reconnaissance by the enemy;

- combating nuclear/missile and air means of attack;

- combating the operational reserves;

- air support and conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

398. The conditions of combat operations of an air army in an operation without employment of nuclear weapons change substantially and have an effect on the nature of its actions and the order of [word illegible]. It must now fulfill tasks for cover planned for rocket troops; it can strike the enemy in the entire depth of his formation.

399. Combat operations of an army are reduced:

- nuclear weapons are not employed;

- part of the forces must be held in readiness for nuclear strikes, but it must be kept in view that there can be [1-2 words missing] situation, when [3-4 words missing] operate only with conventional [word missing] (but with complete assurance that [2-3 words illegible])

[12 lines missing]

400. . . . mobile (70 percent). Combat operations of an air army will be difficult. It will be necessary to overcome the enemy's air defense. Without the effects of nuclear weapons it will be viable and stubborn. Also for this

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reason it will be necessary to detail additional forces from the air army to suppress it.

401. Combat operations without employment of nuclear weapons can be initiated by an air operation of the air forces, which is conducted for the purpose of defeating aircraft groupings in the theater of military operations.

402. Participating in such an operation, the air army on the first day of its performance will fulfill tasks only according to the plan of the air operation--on behalf of the troops of the front, only limited actions, for example, reconnaissance--cover from air strikes and troop support in only the most minimal amount.

Covering Troops

403. This is an important task of an air army, as both in nuclear and non-nuclear warfare, tactical air forces of the enemy remain a powerful resource in the theater of military operations, while the effectiveness of combat against it on the airfields sharply decreases. As a result of this, the volume of possible targets of the enemy in the process of cover of troops decreases. This can be reflected...

[6 lines missing]

404. . . . can be employed. The enemy's tactical air power is the main means for delivery of nuclear weapons in the theater of military operations. It can be based at a significant depth. The air army and long-range air forces will be called in to combat it.

405. Along with air support for troops, an air army may participate in conducting fire preparation.

406. Fire preparation is conducted before the troops go over to the attack, and at the start of an operation, and in the process of an offensive when troops have not been successful in overcoming the defensive line rapidly. It is executed in joint action with artillery. The main objectives for the air forces are operational-tactical [word missing] the immediate reserves [2 words missing] control points [3 words missing].

Features of Carrying Out Tasks of  
Reconnaissance in the Depth of . . .

[10 lines missing]

407. . . . objectives for the nuclear echelon. Aircraft which are dispersed are camouflaged and are kept in technical readiness for combat operations. Nuclear bombs can be secured to the aircraft or can be located in mobile

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repair-technical bases (PRTB) in special alert (?) -5 (ST-5). The PRTB must be in proximity to the airfields of the delivery aircraft. Transportation for nuclear munitions is readied, and all measures for combat and special servicing of delivery aircraft must be taken ahead of time.

408. Bomber take-off time is 5-10 minutes after the signal--only when aircraft are in readiness No. 1 with the nuclear bombs attached.

409. In determining the time to prepare delivery aircraft for takeoff, account is taken of the time expended to transport nuclear munitions from the PRTB to the aircraft. The speed of the transfer vehicles is up to 40 km/h on paved and up to 30 km/h on unpaved roads. For transport [2 words missing] up to 20 km/h. The time for attaching the nuclear warheads is also taken into account. Commanders of air armies must also consider the support of delivery aircraft in the air with combat [word missing]. They can be [word missing].

DEFENSIVE OPERATION OF AN ARMY

Question 1

Conditions for going over to defense

410. The experience of previous wars shows that defense, as a form of combat operation, developed together with the offensive. There have been no combat operations where there has not been defense.

411. Contemporary military art acknowledges all forms of combat actions, but considers that only the offensive can resolve the outcome of war. But on certain axes an army and [2-3 words missing] go over to the defensive to [word missing] the enemy and decisive transition to the offensive.

412. The conditions for transition of an army to defense will be conditioned by . . .

[6 lines missing]

413. . . . for defense of the country's territory. An army can make the transition to the defense while still in the period of threat along a seacoast for its defense and along borders with neutral nations.

414. During World War II, armies went over to the defense when the enemy shifted to a counterstrike, for example, in the Budapest operation, at the height of the Berlin operation, when the 52nd and 2nd airborne regiments (?) (VP) conducted defense on the Dresden axis for a week.

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415. Under conditions of a nuclear war--when the enemy delivers a preemptive nuclear strike--and begins an offensive.

416. In the course of combat operations when the outcome of a meeting engagement in combat operations is not in favor of the army.

417. Along a maritime axis, for defense of a seacoast. Troops should boldly go into combat [word missing] the enemy, creating groupings and . . .

[6 lines missing]

418. . . . perimeters for defense.

419. Employment of the means of mass destruction makes it possible to organize defense with a more decisive goal. The fact that the front will advance along other axes will aid in this. Defense must assure the conditions for the development of the advance of the front along the main axis.

420. On a maritime direction, repelling and destroying the enemy's landing forces.

421. For defense on the main axis, a combined-arms army occupies a breadth of 100-120 kilometers [1-2 words missing]--defense - 100-150 kilometers and more. Under present-day capabilities of advance of an enemy.

[13 lines missing]

422. Everything must be done in order that the troops are well-trained. It is necessary now in peacetime to train the soldiers. In the course of a defensive action it is necessary to carry out maneuvers with the forces. Utilize every minute to perfect the defense. It must be unexpected for the enemy.

423. It is necessary to destroy the enemy while he is still at distant approaches [word missing]. It is necessary to lead the enemy astray.

424. When an army is going over to defense, it is necessary everywhere [word missing] the enemy. It is necessary to take measures to ward off [3-4 words missing] nuclear strikes of the enemy, combat his landing forces, simultaneously forestall disembarkation while the enemy is still approaching. Everything must be organized in the course of combat operations.

425. Under conditions where nuclear weapons are not being employed, be ready always for employment of nuclear weapons.

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Question 2

ADOPTING A DECISION FOR A DEFENSIVE OPERATION

426. It is difficult to say what the conditions will be, but under any conditions an army must accomplish its task with the means it possesses; the task must be fulfilled at any price.

427. But it is possible to foresee the conditions of defense and act with the means which remain.

428. The commander of an army must elaborate the plans in tactical detail.

[18 lines missing]

429. . . . The process of adopting a decision requires clarification of the task and an estimate of the situation.

430. As a result of the clarification of the task and the estimate, the army determines the tasks. They include:

- where, when, what enemy and the sequence for routing him;
- where to concentrate one's forces and how to act;
- tasks for the troops;
- main line of resistance;
- tasks for the reserves and the 2nd echelon;
- time periods for preparedness for defense (they are not identical);
- time periods for the system of fire;
- time period for preparing the positions;
- perimeters of the reserves;
- perimeters and organization of control;

[7 lines missing]

431. The composition of forces and means in each case will have peculiarities. It is necessary to avoid a stereotype. Echeloning of forces and means can vary. In defense without employment of nuclear weapons as well. The elements are:

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- 1st echelon, IInd echelon, reserves;
- grouping of nuclear means (artillery);
- engineer and other reserves;
- control points.

432. The layout of defense must assure the systematic growth of forces and means, freedom of maneuver.

433. In going over to defense, the following must be taken into account: A division occupies for defense 8 (?) and more km--a regiment, two, battalion - 1. [word missing] main line of resistance--depends on conditions in the course of combat actions; it can be occupied on the [word missing] which have been attained.

[6 lines missing]

434. ... Large units of the 1st echelon will be assigned zones of up to 30 kilometers, and in places of difficult access 40-50 and more kilometers. Without employment of nuclear weapons the enemy will strive to create more concentrated groupings. This should be taken into account and concentration should be created by drawing from the second echelon and the reserves. And also bring up the reserves of the army.

435. The line of defense (an arc of 60-80 kilometers)--**Army reserves** - it happens that there begins a critical period but there must be restraint. But if the situation is compelling - consideration must be made concerning at whose expense the reserve is to be created.

436. Reserves of antitank, engineer mobile obstacle detachment (PDZ), chemical defense elements -- consideration must be given as to where to place them.

437. In nuclear warfare these resources must be treated economically.

438. The system of fire is built up with consideration being given to nuclear, chemical and conventional resources of aircraft -- it includes preparation of strikes on the approaches to the defense.

439. Antitank defense will require special attention; it is in the entire depth, especially on the tank-threatened axes.

440. Defense will be planned [word missing] tasks.

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[NOTE: The following paragraphs apparently are part of an incomplete section on amphibious and airborne landings.]

441. [Two or three words missing] composition (up to 75 troops) of a battalion (first echelon) is expected to take 50-60 minutes, regiment 1-2 hours, division 5-6 hours, army corps 12-15 hours. These official norms are not always achieved in NATO. (For example, the composition of one division of motorized infantry -- one regimental sector (two battalion points) in 29 hours.

442. Airborne forces -- if they are employed in naval landing operations -- are dropped for two purposes: support for landing of amphibious forces (in which case 3-5 hours before starting at a depth of 30 kilometers from the shoreline) and blocking or delaying approach of the reserves of the enemy into the amphibious landing area (in which case simultaneously with the amphibious landing or somewhat later at a depth of up to 200 kilometers). The procedure for dropping the airborne force can be the following. The first ones to jump are small subunits (to set up guidance for aircraft and transmittal of signals). Following the forward subunits the basic forces of the assault echelon are landed. Then on the seized bridgehead the remaining forces are landed. It is considered that an airborne division can function without resupply of munitions and supplies for 2-3 days.

443. Expansion of the landing bridgehead and buildup of forces and resources upon it. Occupation of a corps bridgehead (to a depth of up to 40 kilometers) with massive employment of nuclear weapons and dispatch of a major airborne force on D-day; using amphibious landing without airborne forces, D-day +2 to D-day +4. Rate of advance is planned at 10-20 kilometers a day. The second echelon, on the axis of success of the first echelon. Combat operations for expansion of the bridgehead, as ground forces. In the first echelon the task of armored troops is to join up with the airborne forces. Expansion -- in depth and breadth -- the important task is occupation of airfields, ports, naval bases. On shore the division (or army) commander is in command.

444. The airborne operation is considered completed after attainment of the tasks assigned to it -- seizure of the necessary bridgehead, which assures the development of a new ground forces combat front, seizure of islands, joining up with troops operating on the coastal axis, etc. (Conclusion -- evaluation of the political goals which are set before imperialist navies.)

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ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION IN OPERATIONS

Importance of Intelligence -- Introduction

I. Possible Indicators of Immediate Preparation by the Enemy to Attack

445. - Detection of them, this is a most important task of intelligence;
- new means of combat -- nuclear weapons -- factor of surprise;
  - in the past, mobilization on a world-wide scale;
  - at present, means of nuclear attack at high combat readiness, while in the theaters of military operations, groupings created, air forces, duty units, launch installations and other rear area questions; the problem of the rear area is different;
  - the problem of concentration, formerly and at present;
  - but now there have appeared new indicators -- it is necessary to utilize electronics and radio-electronics;
  - the period of immediate preparation will be but brief (from several days to several hours) and there will be fewer indicators of this preparation. But for preparation it will be necessary to conduct various measures -- which will have intelligence significance.

446. These indicators can really be divided into categories of general indications of preparation for attack and indications of immediate preparation for attack in a theater of military operations. They are mutually related.

General Indicators of Preparation by the Enemy to Attack

447. - Sharp change in the international situation and increased combat readiness and transition (not complete) from peacetime to war footing of the economy of the countries;
- new national and coalition, extraordinary organizations may be created and convoked;
  - mobilization plans may be put into effect (especially in the economy);

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- areas of special mobilization -- counterespionage procedures are strengthened.

448. With the commencement of immediate preparation for attack, there will also be other undertakings, particularly in bringing to readiness organizations of military control and the armed forces:

- change in the working procedure of the command personnel of the armed forces;
- hasty formation of the leadership of the armed forces -- organizing and reporting to the political leadership;
- bringing the armed forces to increased combat preparedness;
- there will be special types of telegrams and radiograms;
- verification during time periods not previously anticipated of strategic plans for the utilization of the armed forces, and particularly strategic means of nuclear attack;
- deployment of additional radio networks of communication within the higher military control organizations of the nations of the coalition and active radio transmission;
- transfer of a certain number of large units and units from the reserves to the regular forces;
- adoption of urgent measures for maintaining secrecy;
- transfer of higher military and governmental control organizations into underground points;
- introduction of limitations in utilization of means of communication, employment of new radio data, codes, ciphers and equipment of reserve means of communication for control of strategic means of attack, and other groupings of the armed forces carrying out partial covert mobilization.

449. The following are important:

- increase in the number of crews of aircraft of the strategic air forces carrying nuclear bombs on duty in the air;
- dispersal of strategic aircraft;

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- deployment of special means of the air forces of the U.S. to forward bases;
- and others, such as deployment of naval forces under the guise of exercises.

Indicators of Preparation by the Enemy to Attack in a Theater of Military Operations

450. The basic means of nuclear attack is aircraft. It is at high combat preparedness; (15') 15 percent of the planes are on duty. But for all aircraft, measures are necessary which will have intelligence indicators.

- It is necessary to deploy a system of control points for vectoring to ground targets (in a first-echelon division -- several); a unit is already in existence but it is far (70-100 km) from the border. The range of the control system is 250-300 kilometers in all. Those deployed in peacetime must change location.

451. Thus, for one or two days deployment is going on. After deployment, the instrumentation has to be tested.

- A most important indicator is massive issuance of nuclear munitions from depots and delivery to airfields, supply points and areas of missile launch positions. This can be carried out from base depots (at a great distance) -- issuance is 24 hours before nuclear attack.
- Loading of nuclear munitions on aircraft -- 3-4 hours before takeoff of the aircraft, while mass takeoff of aircraft is 20-30 minutes before commencement of the attack or of overflight of the border. Radio exchange is curtailed, but cutting it off entirely is impossible.
- Takeoff into the air and verification of the operation of the air command post, the 2nd and 4th Combined Tactical Air Commands and 17th Air Army -- this type of test is one day before commencement of attack (but for secrecy, several hours before the nuclear strike).
- In the period of immediate preparation for attack, the grouping of aircraft may be reinforced by transfer of aircraft from the U.S. (preparation of airfields not in use) but this can also fail to take place (transfer).
- To bring ground forces to full combat readiness it is necessary to take combat equipment out of storage, fuel it, load ammunition into tanks and

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assault guns, deploy command posts under field conditions, initiate combat alert of the troops, bring them to concentration areas, receive the assignment, adopt the decision, pass the tasks to commands of large units, units and subunits.

- Receipt of nuclear munitions by ground forces and deployment of mobile field points of supply and storage of special munitions.

452. Missile units in peacetime are in varying degrees of combat readiness. Full ("P") -- one in each unit is prepared to launch in 20 minutes; the other batteries in one or two hours. Increased ("S") -- must redeploy -- one to two days. Antiaircraft missiles -- deployed but the greater part of them must change their site areas -- one or two days, and for full deployment in areas of fixed location, two to four hours.

453. For the period of immediate preparation for attack there will be a characteristic change in the mode of operation of air defense radiotechnical reconnaissance posts; transition to round-the-clock duty at the deployed posts, deployment of posts and initiation of operation of the ones located not only in the border zone, but also in the depth.

454. Carrier strike forces (AUS) must deploy to the line of launch of deck-based aircraft -- a distance not exceeding the tactical radius of operations of the aircraft. But the transfer from the U.S. to the Norwegian Sea or the Bay of Biscay takes seven to nine days. Take-off of aircraft is one hour before the strike.

455. Missile nuclear submarines -- one or two days before the strike -- testing of the combat readiness of the "Loran-C" radionavigating system. One day before there takes place a check of rapid-action radio communications of submarines from their deployment area to fleet headquarters. However, when using the Transit artificial earth satellite system for fixing positions of nuclear submarines, this indicator may be absent.

456. Also anticipated is the deployment ahead of time of supplementary antisubmarine forces of the U.S. and Great Britain to the antisubmarine lines in the Barents and Norwegian seas and the North Atlantic, but this requires from three to nine days. (This will precede the movement of the carrier strike forces into these waters.)

457. In this period, dispersal of naval vessels -- at present, 50 percent of the naval forces of the U.S. and Great Britain are at naval bases. (They may be destroyed at the beginning of the war.)

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458. Also being exercised is the removal of merchant vessels from ports and inland seas of socialist countries to prevent their seizure and also from their own ports to the ocean. (During an exercise, 48 hours before the start of combat operations, there were brought out from the ports of Europe, the U.S. and Canada into the Atlantic more than 2,000 large ships, 90 percent of which were in ports at this time.)

459. Important is any change in the nature of operation of radioelectronic means of the enemy: starting operation or testing at an unusual time; change in the mode of operation of the means of radiocommunications, radar and radionavigation, increase in the volume of enciphered transmission by radio, change of ciphers, of call signs and frequencies; switching to periodic demonstration [two or three words missing] and of the Atlantic coast of Europe, and also of the Pacific Ocean basin destined to support the operations of nuclear submarines and strategic aircraft at low altitudes.

460. Activation of flights of reconnaissance aircraft along the borders of the Socialist Camp; increased cover of national borders by means of movement into border zones of mobile armored and mechanized units; taking measures to protect troops and the civilian populace from our strikes (testing of the alert system, evacuation of the populace from major industrial centers, preparation and occupation of shelters). The issuance to personnel of new means of defense against weapons of mass destruction is important.

461. Thus, the more specific indicators of immediate preparation to deliver a nuclear strike may be:

- intensive radio exchange between crews of bombers and crews of tanker aircraft in the areas of possible inflight refueling;
- crossing by "patrolling" aircraft with nuclear bombs of boundaries established for them and continuation of flight in our direction;
- occupation by carrier strike forces of waters of combat maneuver and by nuclear submarines of launch positions;
- more frequent transmissions of meteorological reports -- to headquarters;
- [two or three words missing] . . . delivery of nuclear munitions (to airfields, missile units);
- takeoff by strategic bombers from their bases;

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- entry into operation of new, previously unnoted means of control, and also vigorous operations of the means of radio countermeasures;
- sharp step-up of flights of reconnaissance aircraft;
- departure of covering units to areas located in the immediate proximity of national borders;
- switch to mode of uninterrupted operation of posts for guidance to surface targets, vigorous operation of radar means of the air defense system, and of airborne bombing and radionavigation systems;
- mass takeoff by tactical aircraft and their flight at low altitudes to the national borders of countries of the Socialist Camp;
- transmission of signals authorizing employment of nuclear weapons.

462. If we classify the above indicators by time and by degree of combat readiness of NATO armed forces, then the following picture takes shape:

Degree of Combat Readiness	Time Before Start of Attack	Means of Nuclear Attack	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Navy

II. Fundamentals of Strategic Intelligence

463. Strategic intelligence -- this is the combination of measures conducted by a military command for the purpose of systematic acquisition, in peacetime as well as in time of war, of political, military, economic, scientific and technical data concerning the foreign countries which are the probable enemies. On this basis, military capabilities of nations are determined and their political and military-strategic concepts are identified.

464. In imperialist countries the activity of intelligence is not limited to the collection of information; it is also used to influence domestic and foreign policies -- subversive activity of capitalist intelligence services is an example. Our intelligence service -- in principle differs from them both by its class nature and the content of the tasks being fulfilled.

465. Our intelligence service is called upon in peacetime to expose the aggressive plans of imperialist countries, alert the government and the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense about preparation for war and readiness for it on the part of the probable enemy, above all the possibility of surprise attack, and to study constantly the military and economic power of this enemy.

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466. In a time of immediate threat our activity increases -- in order to discover information having a direct bearing on the conduct of armed combat and of war generally, especially intelligence on means of nuclear attack (all) and other mass destruction.

467. Military intelligence is part of the entire intelligence service of a country. It is divided into strategic, operational and tactical.

468. Strategic intelligence is organized by the General Staff and is conducted in order to assure defense for socialist countries, develop war plans and implement them rapidly if war is unleashed by the imperialist countries.

469. Operational intelligence is organized by the commands of military districts, the navy and armies and is conducted in order to furnish the command with the necessary data to make decisions and conduct operations.

470. Tactical intelligence is organized by all commanders and staffs of large units, units and subunits, chiefs of arms of troops, special troops and services and is conducted in order to acquire the necessary information to prepare for and successfully wage combat. The forces of these intelligence units do not operate in an isolated manner but reciprocally complement and supplement one another;

- difficulty in conduct of combat operations increases the role of intelligence.

Main Tasks of Strategic Intelligence

471. Strategic intelligence accomplishes them in peacetime and in time of war -- main effort -- in peacetime to provide the government and High Command (GK) with all information. Basic tasks are determined by the government and the General Staff. Military operations of various Communist countries can vary -- the tasks are:

- military political plans, etc. (notebook)

472. Forces and resources of strategic intelligence -- strategic intelligence is divided into types, of which the main ones are: space, agent operations, legal (official foreign apparatus of intelligence), radio and radiotechnical intelligence, aircraft intelligence, surface ship intelligence.

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### III. Forces and Resources of Operational Intelligence (Front and Army)

473. For fulfillment of intelligence tasks a modern front has at its disposal various forces and resources of front and army subordination, and also entities which are organizationally parts of large units and units of arms of troops, special troops and services of the front.

#### Agent Intelligence and Its Capabilities

474. Prior to the commencement of military operations, agent intelligence of border military districts (groups) is one of the main forms of operational intelligence. Operating covertly, capable of surveilling the disposition, status and actions of troops, staffs and other facilities of the enemy. Located on enemy territory, often directly in targets being reconnoitered, agent intelligence can determine the location and nature of the means of mass destruction; obtain data on combat strength, equipment, weapons, degree of combat readiness and the political-psychological state of personnel; discover changes in the mode of operation of troop control, in the composition and actions of large units (or units); obtain information on regrouping of troops, on mobilizational measures being conducted, their purposes, and in a number of instances, also, on its plans for impending actions; ascertain the departure of troops and equipment (nuclear) from places of permanent location and into areas of concentration (site areas) and to lines of deployment, and also delivery of nuclear munitions to missile units and airfields.

475. In the course of operations, constantly observing the troops, control organs, and other facilities, agent operations can also obtain data which describe the composition, status, actions and intentions of the enemy. With the initiation of combat operations, agent intelligence can guide our aircraft and airborne elements to the reconnoitered objectives of the enemy.

476. Strong aspects of agent intelligence -- agents are capable of penetrating directly into reconnoitered facilities (headquarters, airfields, bases, ports) where they can obtain reliable (information) not only about the targets but also about enemy intentions.

477. Weak aspects of agent intelligence include: vulnerability to counterintelligence; loss of the capability to obtain the necessary data in connection with a change in the situation; limited capabilities for movement of agents in the enemy's rear area; difficulty and, consequently, insufficiently rapid transmittal of acquired intelligence information and possibility of enemy direction-finding of the radio transmitter; impossibility in many instances for agent sources to accompany mobile targets

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departing for new areas and to observe uninterruptedly their position, status and actions; in a number of instances of low level of accuracy in determining locations (coordinates) of targets being reconnoitered; difficulty in selecting and training agents to collect intelligence.

478. At the front there is a corresponding agent apparatus, whose capabilities depend on the specific conditions of the situation. A well-trained agent intelligence service can acquire reliable information but it must be corroborated, refined and complemented by information from other types of intelligence.

479. Special intelligence and its capabilities -- like agent operations, it operates in enemy territory and is carried out by the forces of intelligence groups and detachments which are created using personnel of special purpose subunits (units). In contrast to agent operations, special intelligence can fulfill intelligence tasks only with the start of combat operations and is organized mainly for the purpose of discovering locations and the nature of operations and to determine the coordinates of enemy nuclear/missile weapons, the radiotechnical means which support their employment, and other important facilities.

480. Front -- a battalion -- up to 27-36 reconnaissance groups -- or several reconnaissance detachments, and also companies of the army, from which it is possible to form 9-12 reconnaissance groups.

481. In addition, there will be utilized groups from divisions -- in a company are five groups for deep reconnaissance.

482. Thus, in all in a front (3-4 armies) (16-22 divisions), there can be up to 150-200 groups for special and deep reconnaissance. Well-trained groups -- numbering 5-17 men each -- are a quite effective means of reconnaissance and for the destruction of various facilities in the enemy's rear area.

483. In addition to nuclear and other means of mass destruction, reconnaissance groups can detect disposition areas, forces, the composition and nature of activity of enemy reserves, his control points and radioelectronic means, monitor their movement, detect airfields and the presence of aircraft on them, the most important installations of the rear area, determine results of our nuclear strikes, and also guide aircraft to the detected installations and carry out target designation for missiles.

484. Reconnaissance groups are capable not only of finding facilities but also of determining their nature, coordinates and, when necessary, destroying or putting out

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of commission the materiel, personnel and equipment. The weak aspects are the difficulty of selecting and training the personnel, dispatching them, and difficulty of movement.

485. The basic method of operation of small reconnaissance groups is covert observation and elicitation.

- Under favorable circumstances -- capture and interrogation of prisoners, seizure and study of documents of the enemy, questioning of the local populace. When it is impossible to fulfill assigned tasks covertly, they can carry out bold attacks on the installations or sabotage (diversiya) i.e., active operations.

486. Larger-scale groups and detachments of special designation can simultaneously with reconnaissance fulfill tasks for destruction or putting out of commission the detected installations of the enemy, especially means of nuclear attack and technical means of control.

487. Reconnaissance groups are dispatched into the rear area of the enemy usually by parachute at a depth of 1,000 kilometers for a front and 500 or more kilometers for an army. Deep penetration groups go by helicopters or penetrate into the rear area of the enemy through the front line on foot or, under favorable circumstances, by vehicle-reconnaissance of enemy facilities at a depth of up to 100 kilometers. On a coastal axis landings can be made from submarines.

488. The area of reconnaissance is determined for the group and one or two tasks can be assigned. While in the rear areas, the groups, as a rule, move clandestinely, avoiding the highways, and on foot. They need time after being dispatched for orientation and study of the area of operation. Experience of exercises: the report on the first results of reconnaissance comes 5-6 hours after dispatch. (It is necessary to dispatch them well ahead of time.)

#### Forces and Means of Radio, Radiotechnical and Radar Intelligence

489. Radio is engaged in acquisition of information on the enemy by means of detection and intercept of transmissions effected by radio means, etc. Radiotechnical - radar means, etc; radar - air, ground and water surface, by illuminating them, etc.

490. Under modern conditions, troop control is impossible without the utilization of means of radiocommunications, radar, radionavigation, radio remote control.

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491. Targets for radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance are headquarters, control points, airfields, aircraft, guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, artillery, nuclear weapon depots, etc.

492. By means of processing of data, we obtain data which expose the intentions of the enemy, his grouping, etc.

493. The main thing is the timely discovery of the areas of disposition of the means of delivery of nuclear munitions from depots and preparation of the enemy to deliver nuclear strikes. This can be carried out by means of uninterrupted observation, etc.

494. After having discovered the radio networks, intelligence monitors their operation.

495. A front has a radio regiment and a radiotechnical regiment. Armies have one battalion each, and companies of radiotechnical reconnaissance are in divisions.

496. Independent radio regiment -- assignment, composition, capabilities: 97 posts of radio intercept and 32 radio direction-finding posts, which assure radio intercept to a depth of 2,000 kilometers and direction-finding to a depth of 1,000 kilometers with a breadth of zone of 400-500 kilometers (helicopter).

497. Independent radiotechnical regiment -- assignment, composition (helicopter) - capabilities, 108 reconnaissance posts of which 80 are radiotechnical and 28 are radio intercept - reconnaissance to a depth of 500 kilometers and more than 2,000 kilometers for radio navigation.

498. Independent radio battalion -- zone of 100 kilometers - composition (helicopters). Capabilities - 24 radio intercept posts, 8 radio direction-finding posts - radio reconnaissance to a depth of 200 kilometers (for ground stations) and 350-400 kilometers for airborne stations.

499. Independent radiotechnical battalion -- composition, capabilities (20 round-the-clock reconnaissance posts, including 17 radiotechnical and three radio intercept - ground radiotechnical means) to a depth of 150 kilometers and aircraft to 350-400 kilometers.

500. Company - reconnaissance battalion of a division - five radio intercept posts, three radio direction-finding posts, three radiotechnical posts. Radio reconnaissance 25-30 kilometers, radiotechnical reconnaissance 60 kilometers.

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501. Thus, in a front of the indicated composition there can be created reconnaissance posts: radio intercept up to 340; radiotechnical up to 200; radio direction-finding up to 130. These posts assure the conduct of reconnaissance on all bands of working frequencies of the radio and radiotechnical means of the enemy.

502. A reconnaissance post is understood to mean the smallest subunit capable of fulfilling assigned tasks of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, acquire intelligence information and carry out primary processing of the data.

503. An intercept post can have several radio receivers, demodulating devices and recording equipment. A radio direction-finding post has one reception indication device, means for guidance of the radio direction-finder and means for communications.

504. A radiotechnical post: Each post for radio intercept can conduct uninterrupted observation of two radio networks (two frequencies) or periodic observation of three-four, or monitor 8-10. The average assigned load of one radio direction-finding post is 40 confirmed bearings an hour.

505. A radiotechnical post - 10 ground radar stations and in one hour must fix and determine the technical characteristics of an average of 20-30 radar (or radionavigation) stations.

506. Special helicopters - equipped with apparatus for detection of operation of radio-relay communications.

507. The allocation for three armies in the first echelon (14 divisions) is 273 posts for radio intercept, 98 radio direction-finding and 155 radio-technical, and can assure reconnaissance on up to 820-1,100 radio networks (3-4 radio networks per post) and up to 1,560 radar stations (10 to a post) -- "triangulation" of one station, no less than at two-three radio DF posts.

508. There can also be brought in subunits of the jamming battalion -- it can have up to 150 radio receivers and up to 20 radio direction finders of various wave bands. A great part of them are brought in prior to commencement of combat operations - before conduct of radio reconnaissance. With commencement of radio countermeasures 50-60 percent are for guidance of jamming transmitters.

509. Strong aspects -- weak aspects.

Forces and Means of Aerial Reconnaissance of a Front

510. With commencement of combat operations this is the main form of reconnaissance. It is capable of: in

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short time periods, to a great depth over extended areas, discover various installations, determine coordinates, transmit from the reconnaissance area information for the staffs.

511. Composition - depending on the air army, in the West European theater of military operations it is one or two reconnaissance regiments of operational reconnaissance. In a regiment there are two-three squadrons with 6 aircraft in each; in all there are 46-66 multi-place aircraft of the bomber type for a depth of 1,000 kilometers and more.

512. Tactical reconnaissance regiment - three squadrons with 12 aircraft each for a total of 40 single-place aircraft of the fighter type - depth of 400-500 kilometers; one-two squadrons (battalions) of tactical pilotless reconnaissance aircraft for a depth of 100-150 kilometers. In each squadron there are two detachments, each with two launchers - so in the squadron there are 4 launchers. The combat launch rate is 12 launches in each 24-hour period.

513. In addition, in each air regiment of fighters, (besides interceptors) fighter-bombers, and bombers - one air squadron (10-12 aircraft) is trained as a supplementary (neshtatnaya) reconnaissance squadron. Thus, an air army can count 260-280 reconnaissance aircraft, 76-96 for operational, and 184 aircraft and 4-8 launchers for tactical, reconnaissance.

514. If for conduct of reconnaissance according to plan the air army expends 50 percent of the total number of aircraft sorties of supplementary reconnaissance planes, in the first 24-hour period it can carry out 400-450 aircraft sorties (normal rate) and the increased rate is 500-550. (Normal operational reconnaissance is two sorties per 24-hour period; tactical is three sorties.) Increased rate exceeds normal rate by 1.5-2 times.

515. But only during the decisive periods of combat activity and specifically in the first 2-3 days of an offensive operation of a front. This is along the main axis - on the others it can be less (especially of operational regiments - one, composition of air army is less).

516. Equipment of reconnaissance aircraft: Aircraft of a supplementary reconnaissance squadron do not have equipment - only on five-six aircraft in a squadron are there aerial cameras (visual observation).

517. The capabilities of aerial reconnaissance are determined by the resources with which it is conducted. Aerial photography provides the most complete information about the installations of the enemy and the terrain - it is possible to obtain coordinates for nuclear strikes. The precision of an aerial photo is dependent on the scale - 25-200 meters.

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518. Aerial photography can be plan or perspective - it is produced on scales of 20 to 120 meters and more to one centimeter. According to experience, reconnaissance of nuclear/missile resources on the march and in unloading axes can be assured by plan aerial photography with scales of not more than 60-80 meters. Camouflaged means in areas of concentration and in firing positions - not more than 20-40 meters to one centimeter. Plan aerial photography, with scales of 50-80 meters, makes it possible to reconnoiter airfields with aircraft and determine their type. Aerial photographs, from perspective photography, provide an overall graphic representation of installations and terrain - only during daylight from low and medium altitudes at scales 30-50 meters to a centimeter. Night photography - with artificial light (illuminating beacon). The employment of color and spectro-zonal photo film, makes it possible to detect camouflaged facilities.

519. [two words missing] ... after landing of the aircraft - technology - preparation of the photographs, delivery - much time - (1.5-2 hours). But from wet negatives transmittal of coordinates by telephone -- 20-40 minutes.

520. Data from visual reconnaissance - from altitudes up to 2,000 meters - provide reconnaissance on the field of battle, search for missile means, areas of concentration, re-reconnaissance of the mobile facilities of the enemy. It depends on speed and altitude, camouflage, time of day, experience of the crew - therefore the data can be imprecise. Accuracy of coordinates by this method is 100-600 meters - if it is an obvious installation or terrain, then more precise. The better-trained crews of regular reconnaissance aircraft are capable during daylight from altitudes of 500-800 meters of determining the coordinates with an accuracy of 50-150 meters, from altitudes of 1,000-2,000 meters with an accuracy of 100-300 meters.

521. Aerial reconnaissance can be carried out also with the use of radiotechnical and radar gear and also using data from distance-measuring bomber systems of the DBS-2 and STB types. In operational reconnaissance - in aircraft - there are panoramic radar sets of the type PSBN-M, while in three aircraft - only SRS. Radiotechnical reconnaissance SRS - is conducted for the purpose -- under any and all meteorological conditions to a depth of 130-150 percent of the range of operations of the enemy's radio-technical means (in practice, 300-400 kilometers from the reconnaissance aircraft).

522. Radar intelligence is conducted using panoramic radar sets (bomb sights). It is carried out in the absence of optical visibility. [one line missing] ... radar relationship to objects such as lakes, rivers, bridges, ships, and populated places, observation from a distance of 100-150 kilometers.

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523. Television apparatus is a perspective means of reconnaissance which can be used to equip several operational reconnaissance aircraft. Television apparatus makes it possible during daylight from an altitude of 7,000-11,000 meters to observe and photograph objects on the screen, transmit to ground command posts the images of the sectors of terrain and uncamouflaged objects up to 200-300 kilometers.

524. Distance-measuring radiotechnical systems DBS-2 and STB are employed for approach of aircraft to an assigned objective in the absence of visual sighting and for determination of the position of the aircraft at the moment it reaches the target. In fact, the coordinates of the target (objective) can be determined with an accuracy of 100-150 meters. The range of operation of the DBS-2 system is 380-400 kilometers and for the system STB it is 200 kilometers - at an altitude of 10,000 meters. In so doing, the coordinates of the target are determined at a ground station. When ground stations are installed on a helicopter (at an altitude of 1,600 meters) the range of the DBS-2 reaches 570-600 kilometers, but in so doing the accuracy of the aircraft's position and coordinates are lessened.

525. Metering radiotechnical systems possess limited capabilities for simultaneously supporting several reconnaissance aircraft, and especially during a period of mass sorties of reconnaissance aircraft.

526. In determination of the forces and means necessary for fulfillment of the tasks of aerial reconnaissance of a front, calculation should be based on the capabilities of one reconnaissance aircraft crew. The crew of a multi-place reconnaissance aircraft (operational reconnaissance) can in one sortie fulfill one of the following tasks: conduct reconnaissance in a zone of up to 30-40 kilometers during daylight (ten at night) and at a depth of the operating radius of the aircraft; photograph an area of 1,500-3,000 square kilometers or a route 220 kilometers in length and 10.6 kilometers in width; visually reconnoiter and photograph (or determine the coordinates of two-three objectives) or two to four sectors of railroad (or other roads) with an overall length of up to 500 kilometers; detect the operation and determine the tactical-technical data of 8-12 and more radar stations in a zone up to 400 kilometers in breadth; carry out radar reconnaissance of two-three installations and orientation to their approaches; conduct television reconnaissance to a distance of up to 300 kilometers; conduct monitoring of the results of strikes (nuclear) in two to four areas.

527. The crew of a single-place aircraft (tactical reconnaissance) in the course of one sortie can conduct reconnaissance during daylight in a zone up to 10-20 kilometers in breadth and to a depth of the aircraft's operating radius; visually reconnoiter and photograph (or

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determine the coordinates) of two or three objectives; reconnoiter one or two areas (with a size of 20-100 km<sup>2</sup>); reconnoiter two or three sectors of railroads (or other roads) of a total length of up to 250 kilometers; reconnoiter a region of the field of battle with an area of up to 800-2,000 km<sup>2</sup>; carry out monitoring of nuclear strike results in two or three areas; photograph a region with an area of 100-120 km<sup>2</sup>.

528. The capabilities of supplementary reconnaissance are lower - these are average data. On the whole, reconnaissance aircraft totaling up to 260-280 aircraft and four to eight launchers for pilotless means (without taking losses into account) is capable of reconnoitering 700-1,000 different objectives, of which up to 65-70 percent are located in the tactical depth of defense of the enemy. Of this number, the following can be reconnoitered: means of operational reconnaissance (regular TO) up to 190-250 objectives and supplementary up to 260-340 installations. The experience of World War II and exercises prove that sorties can be conducted successfully as follows: in reconnoitering a grouping of ground forces - up to 80-85 percent; launch positions of operational-tactical designation missiles up to 40-60 percent; airfields, bases and composition of aircraft of the enemy - up to 75-85 percent; depots of various designation up to 30-40 percent; railroad (and other) communications - up to 80-90 percent. Consequently, the degree of success of air reconnaissance sorties on the average can be around 60-70 percent of the overall number of aircraft-sorties, which makes it possible to reconnoiter 420-700 installations of the enemy in the zone of a front. The remaining 30-40 percent or 280-300 installations of the enemy must be discovered by the joint efforts of other types of branches of reconnaissance.

Forces and Means of Arms of Troops and Special Troops of an Army and Their Capabilities

529. Armies included in the composition of a front have at their disposal other units and subunits as well, mainly of tactical reconnaissance, which, however, are capable of obtaining reconnaissance data to supplement information on the enemy.

530. A reconnaissance artillery regiment is the means of reconnaissance of the chief of rocket troops and artillery of an army whose composition includes two artillery observation battalions and fire correction reconnaissance, helicopter squadron. One battalion consists of a battery of sound-ranging reconnaissance, radiotechnical reconnaissance, topographic-geodetic platoon. In the other battalion there are photogrammetry, topographic-geodesy and meteorological battery capabilities, etc.

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531. Units which come from the chiefs of arms of troops and services - up to a battalion of a division - tasks, organization, capabilities.

III. Fundamentals of the Organization of Reconnaissance in an Offensive Operation of an Army and a Front

532. The most important condition for the conduct of aggressive and uninterrupted reconnaissance is careful and comprehensively thought out organization.

533. This is taken to mean a complex of measures by a front (army) in order to acquire information about the enemy, about the terrain in the region of impending operations and about the weather. Of these measures, the basic ones include: determination of the purpose and tasks of reconnaissance and allocation of the necessary forces and means for fulfilling them; planning of reconnaissance and assignment of tasks to those fulfilling them; coordination of the efforts of all types of intelligence according to tasks, targets and time; preparation of units and subunits (or groups) which have been selected for conduct of reconnaissance, and comprehensive training of them; monitoring of fulfillment of orders that have been issued and rendering of practical assistance to staffs and commanders of units and subunits in the fulfillment of assigned reconnaissance tasks; organization of uninterrupted communications with units and subunits (groups) assigned to reconnaissance, with subordinate staffs of formations (large units), as well as receipt of intelligence reports emanating from crews of reconnaissance aircraft; elaboration and realization of measures for security of intelligence units and subunits (groups) against weapons of mass destruction; organization of collection and processing of intelligence information and timely reporting of it to the commander and higher headquarters, and also informing elements within the headquarters and subordinate headquarters, and headquarters of neighboring and collaborating formations.

534. In the interests of the initial operations intelligence is organized during peacetime by the staff of the border military district (group). As the situation changes - the threat of unleashing of war by the enemy - changes are incorporated in the organization of intelligence collection, and conduct of it is stepped up.

535. Organization of intelligence is based on a profound understanding of the nature of modern operations, firm knowledge of the capabilities of forces and means of reconnaissance, and skillful utilization of them; constant study of the organization, views on the conduct of combat operations, weapons and combat equipment of enemy troops, as well as extensive manifestation of creativity, initiative, resourcefulness and military cunning.

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536. The basic information for organization of intelligence collection is: the combat task of the formation, decision of the commander of troops of the front (army) and also the combat dispositions for reconnaissance of the next higher headquarters, the available data on the enemy, status of forces and means of reconnaissance and their capabilities. A definite condition for successful organization of intelligence collection is the ability to sort out the major tasks and to concentrate the main efforts for fulfillment of them. In connection with the increased role of intelligence under the conditions of contemporary warfare and new demands placed upon it, the success of the conduct of intelligence collection will in large measure depend upon daily and purposeful management of all the practical activity of intelligence organizations by commands and staffs. Therefore the organization of intelligence collection is a most important responsibility of the commander of troops of a front (army) and of his staff, and also of chiefs of armies of troops and special troops.

537. The commander of troops of a front (army), based on the combat task and evaluation of information about the enemy, determines the goal and more important tasks of intelligence collection, and also indicates where and against what targets (areas or axes) to concentrate its main efforts, what information and by what time it is necessary to have it, hears the reports of the chief of staff of the front (army) and the chief of intelligence on questions of organization of intelligence collection and progress in the fulfillment of the most important tasks.

538. The chief of staff of a front (army) exercises direct control over intelligence collection activity in the formation and bears direct responsibility for the organization of intelligence collection, for making it constant, purposeful and vigorous. The chief of staff must at all times be familiar with the enemy on his zone of the front (army), to anticipate possible changes of the situation and to be prepared to report his conclusions and suggestions which are necessary for the commander to make decisions and carry them out. The chief of staff specifies the tasks of intelligence collection which have been posed by the commander and higher headquarters and the sequence of their fulfillment, determines the targets on which it is necessary to concentrate the main efforts of intelligence collection, and also the forces and means for fulfillment of the more important tasks, and establishes the composition of the reserve of forces and means of intelligence collection. In addition, the chief of staff indicates the main measures for training of intelligence units (subunits) for fulfillment of assigned tasks, the time for submission of the intelligence plan and the combat order for intelligence collection for his signature.

539. The chief of intelligence of the front (army) is the direct organizer of all intelligence measures; he

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bears the responsibility for organization and conduct of intelligence collection, directs the activity of the chiefs of intelligence of subordinate formations (large units), directs subordinate intelligence units and the intelligence directorate (department) of the staff of the front (army).

540. The intelligence directorate (department) of the staff of the formation is charged with the following: planning intelligence collection, allocating tasks to the executors of them; organization and support of the operations of subordinate intelligence units and subunits; direction of them, coordination of problems of conduct of intelligence collection by branches of troops and special troops; organization and maintenance of communications with units and other intelligence organizations conducting reconnaissance against the enemy; control and assistance to troops and staffs in the organization of intelligence collection and fulfillment of intelligence tasks; collection and processing of intelligence data (information) which are being acquired by all types of intelligence collection and being received from higher headquarters and neighboring units, and also reporting on them to the command and higher headquarters and informing the chiefs of arms of troops, special troops and services, of directorates (departments) of the staff and of subordinate headquarters and neighboring units.

541. In addition, the intelligence directorate (department) of the staff of a formation is obligated to: carry out interrogation of prisoners and defectors, questioning of local residents, study of captured documents and samples of new weapons; maintain a listing of the large units and units of the enemy, their combat complement and numbers, weapons and equipment study and collate new techniques and methods for conduct of combat operations, organization of units and large units and transmit these data to the troops; prepare and submit intelligence summaries and reports to higher headquarters; collate and transmit to the troops experience from organization and conduct of intelligence collection; supervise combat readiness of intelligence units; participate in the elaboration of undertakings for intelligence collection and combat with radioelectronic means and in the deception of the enemy.

542. All the work of the intelligence directorate (department) must constantly be coordinated with the main directorates (departments) (operations, political, communications, and combat with the radioelectronic resources of the enemy) and also with the chiefs of the arms of troops and services.

543. The staffs of the arms of troops and services, in turn must have intimate "contact" with the intelligence directorate (department). They must participate in the

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elaboration of a common plan of intelligence collection and on the basis of it carry out detailed planning for reconnaissance of their troop area; submit when necessary requests to the combined-arms headquarters for reconnaissance of those targets on which it is not possible to obtain data using its own forces and resources; carry out direction of the intelligence activity of subordinate forces and means of intelligence collection.

544. The purpose and tasks of intelligence in offensive operations are determined by the overall operational and strategic situation in the theater of military operations, the purpose of the operation being conducted, the content of the tasks being fulfilled by the troops, the combat composition and capabilities of the enemy, and also by the extent of data available on the grouping of his forces, resources, and probable concept of operations.

545. The purpose of intelligence collection by a front in preparation for an offensive operation being conducted at the beginning of war can be timely exposure of immediate preparation of the enemy for nuclear attack, discovery of his concept of operations, finding and destroying the make-up and grouping of means of nuclear attack of the enemy, his ground forces, aircraft, and naval forces, and in the course of the operation, timely determination of changes in the nature of operations and the grouping of troops of the enemy.

546. For achievement of the assigned goal a number of specific tasks for intelligence are defined. The most important of them in an offensive operation conducted at the beginning of a war can be the following:

- determination or accurate definition of the make-up and grouping of missile units of the enemy, the time of their emergence from disposition points into site areas, the coordinates of the launchers and other elements of the combat order in site areas;
- determination or accurate definition of the make-up and grouping of the air forces of the enemy, especially of the aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, time for the initiation of dispersal of nuclear aircraft and of their preparation for delivery of a strike;
- finding the areas of displacement of enemy depots for supply and storage of nuclear munitions;
- exposure of measures for emplacement of nuclear mines along national borders and in the interior of the enemy territory;

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- determination or accurate definition of the make-up and grouping of ground forces, especially armored, time of combat alert for them, and movement toward the border;
- disclosure of the system of defense and antimissile defense of the enemy, his radiotechnical system of observation, missile guidance and control of aircraft to ground and air targets;
- determination of changes in the disposition of control posts of large units and formations of ground forces, air forces and naval forces;
- discovery of undertakings for engineer preparation of defensive lines, creation of a system of barriers, preparation for flooding of certain regions.

547. In the period immediately preceding initiation of combat actions the main attention of the staff of a front (army) must be centered on reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance of targets against which it is planned to deliver the first nuclear strike and subsequent strikes. Re-reconnaissance is conducted for the purpose of confirming the presence of an objective in its previous location or to define the location and coordinates of its individual elements immediately before the delivery of a nuclear strike.

548. Re-reconnaissance in the interests of the initial nuclear strike before it is initiated is conducted chiefly by the forces and means of agent intelligence which are located in the positions of the enemy at the beginning of combat operations, and also the means of radiotechnical reconnaissance. With the initiation of the first nuclear strike, re-reconnaissance employs without limitation all forces and means available to the front (army), primarily aerial reconnaissance.

549. With the initiation of military operations, intelligence must ascertain the results of nuclear strikes which have been delivered in the zone of the offensive of the front (army) both by the front (army) and by strategic resources, and continue to uncover new targets. In addition, it must discover changes in the grouping of ground forces, air forces and naval forces in the theater of military operations, particularly of their nuclear/missile resources, preparation for delivery of mass nuclear strikes, promptly ascertain the time and axis of movement of reserves of the enemy into the zone of the front (army), their composition, subordination, areas of concentration and lines of deployment.

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550. The intelligence elements of a formation moving from the interior of the country for commitment to action will also be assigned the following tasks: ascertain the condition of bridges in the zone of advance, especially crossings over water barriers and passes through mountains, and also discover the grouping of nuclear/missile means and ground forces along the line of commitment to action.

551. In an offensive operation of a front (army), depending on specific developments in the situation, the volume and content of tasks listed for intelligence can be refined and supplemented. In the course of the operation there can arise entirely new tasks, for the fulfillment of which there will be required not only retargeting or detailing of additional forces and resources of intelligence, but also a shift of its main efforts to new axes.

552. An intelligence zone usually coincides with the zone of advance of a front (army). However, in the organization of intelligence collection, account must be taken of possible changes in the situation not only in the zone of impending advance of troops of the front (army), but also in the zones of operations of neighboring units, above all on adjacent flanks. Because of this, it is advisable in some instances to cut out an intelligence zone somewhat wider than the zone of advance, in order to discover in good time an advance of troops of the enemy into the zone of the front (army) from neighboring axes, and also to discover on these axes the positioning areas of nuclear/missile means of the enemy, which he may utilize to deliver nuclear strikes against the troops of the front (army).

553. In organizing intelligence collection, its forces and means must be utilized in a purposeful manner, in accordance with their capabilities and exclusively for fulfillment of the most important tasks. Efforts should not be diffused in fulfillment of secondary tasks, especially during peacetime, when employment of the most important resources of intelligence is limited.

554. In order to fulfill these tasks successfully, as well as for execution of re-reconnaissance of targets, it is necessary to anticipate detailing reserves of forces and resources of intelligence, and in so doing, such means as are capable of being committed to action rapidly should be detailed to the reserve in order to achieve a high level of productivity.

555. Planning of intelligence collection of a front (army) to support an offensive operation conducted with the initiation of hostilities is carried out ahead of time, during peacetime, and is refined with the receipt of directives for the conduct of the operation.

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556. The essence of planning of intelligence consists of the correct determination of its goals and specific tasks, of purposeful allocation of the forces and means of intelligence according to the tasks (objectives) and axes, of determination of the time necessary to prepare the forces and resources of intelligence for the impending operations, selection of the main and reserve positions (areas, axes) for deployment of the operations of forces and resources of intelligence, apportionment of a reserve of forces and resources, of coordination of the efforts of the various types of intelligence and intelligence organs of staffs in determining the procedure for maintaining communications and uninterrupted control of intelligence organs, determination of the procedure for submission of intelligence information, and also in the elaboration of other measures directed at the most complete accomplishment of the assigned tasks.

557. The sequence of operation for the planning of intelligence collection and its content depends on specific conditions. Therefore, in approaching the planning of intelligence, the chief of intelligence of a front (army) must carefully study and evaluate the enemy, the terrain he is occupying, and, on the basis of definite patterns from the experience of exercises, and also the actual situation and possible changes in it, must determine approximately:

- what groupings of ground forces, air forces and naval forces the enemy can create;
- what quality of nuclear/missile weapons he will have at his disposal; where, when and what more important objectives the enemy may have against which it will be advantageous to deliver our nuclear/missile strike.

558. On the basis of a profound knowledge of the situation and insight into its possible changes, the chief of intelligence must determine the axes and areas for special attention, against which it will be necessary to concentrate the main efforts of intelligence -- such areas can be:

- areas where it is most probable there will be deployment of combat formations of nuclear/missile units of the enemy, in which are located troops and other important objectives, or which may be designated areas of concentration of large units of ground forces, especially tanks, and also lines of their deployment in combat formation;
- airfield centers for aircraft carrying nuclear weapons;
- departure areas for landing airborne troops;

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- major depots and bases of supply for nuclear weapons;
- important road junctions through which it is possible reserves may be brought up;
- the most important ports for disembarking troops, combat equipment, materials and supplies, etc.

559. The number and the dimensions of the areas of special attention are determined by the specific situation and by the capabilities of the forces and resources of intelligence. In the zone of advance of a front there can be designated 20-30 areas of special attention with an area of 50 to 300-400 km<sup>2</sup>; in the zone of advance of an army there can be 8-12 areas. When there is an insufficiency of forces and means for simultaneous surveillance of all the areas, the tasks of intelligence must be resolved systematically by available forces and also with the assistance of the resources of higher and collaborating formations (on request).

560. Planning of intelligence collection for offensive operations conducted at the beginning of a war should logically be done taking into consideration the tasks which can be accomplished by troops in the course of the operation. In so doing, the great maneuverability of troops in combat operations, as well as the rapid and abrupt changes in the situation which will usually arise on the eve of a war and with the initiation of operations, will require from the commander of the troops of a front (army) new decisions, which will give rise to the necessity to introduce refinements in the intelligence plan, and in a number of instances, substantial changes.

561. Planning of intelligence, as a rule, is executed for the entire depth of the offensive operation. The most complete determination of the tasks of intelligence, and detailed planning of undertakings for fulfillment of them, is made during the period of preparation of an operation and fulfillment by troops of a front (army) of the immediate task. Planning of intelligence collection for the period of fulfillment of the follow-up task is carried out in general terms, with subsequent detail being filled in during the course of the operation, depending on the specific development of the situation. Methods of planning intelligence collection can vary, but the basic idea must consist of coordinating in the best way possible the efforts of all the resources and types of intelligence of a front (army) and resolve the maximum number of intelligence tasks in the shortest time possible. For this purpose, the allocation of forces and resources of intelligence by targets and areas of special attention is most practically carried out from the enemy's rear area to the line of the front (national border).

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562. Collection against enemy targets located at a great distance from the line of the front is best managed by using primarily forces and resources of front subordination.

[NOTE: The position of the following charts in the document is unknown.]

[Portion of Title Missing] Missiles

	R-300				Total	
	?	?	40	100		
[2/3 of chart missing]	14?	-	8?	6	14	6
	12?	?	7	6	14	6
	55?	-	9	11	20	120
	?	3	10	5	18	6
	7	2	8	7	17	9
				6	35	9
	12			6	18	6

For the initial nuclear strike

11th Army - Parachute division (?) PPD	9
in [2 words missing] -	21
10th Army - Parachute division (?) PPD	13
in [2 words missing] -	21
16th <u>Front</u> Missile Brigade in 12 -	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>75/129</b>

Comparison of Forces

No.	Forces and Means			
-				
12		12-16	[MISSING]	
24	guns . . . . .			
3	divisions . . . . .			
594	tanks . . . . .			
402	guns . . . . .			

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ORGANIZATION OF AN ARTILLERY DIVISION OF THE  
RESERVE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

Individual Battalions	?	?	BM-?	?	?
gun - ?	54	[MISSING]			

Fire Capabilities of the Artillery of a Motorized Rifle  
Division and a Tank Division

Number of guns and combat vehicles	Motorized Rifle Division	Tank Division
	126 18	78 18
Fire potential		
Destruction of tactical nuclear means	8 batteries	5(?) batteries
Neutralization of ground and antiaircraft artillery	12 batteries	8 batteries
Neutralization of sheltered personnel	?	
Neutralization of unsheltered personnel	[MISSING]	
Number of antitank guided missiles (?)	[MISSING]	
Fire potential of		

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